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THE MAKING OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN THE 19808
ABSTRACT
This paper, written for an NBER conference on "American
Economic Policy in the 1980s," discusses the dollar from the
standpoint,not of what moved the exchange rate or what policies
might have been better, but rather of why the political system
adopted the policies that it did. The first half is a chronology of
major exchange rate developments during the decade. The second half
analyzes the actors and interest groups involved, their views on
exchange rate policy, and the system within which they interacted.
The strong dollar policy of the first Reagan Administration was
less the result of the power of a particular economic ideology or
interest group, than it was the result of Treasury Secretary Donald
Regan's tenacious defense of the desirability of the side-effects of
thePresident's economic program. The more pragmatic response of
his successor, James Baker, tothe problems of the trade deficit was
tosanction the depreciation of the dollar from 1985 to 1987. But
hereagain, the success of the Plaza strategy was less the result of
a skillful and deliberate manipulation of policy tools to satisfy
importantinterest groups, than it was the outcome of a
mutually—reinforcingconvoy of three bandwagons: bandwagons of the
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Although the 1970s were the decade when foreign exchange
rates broke free of the confines of the Bretton Woods system under
which governments since 1944 had been committed to keeping them
fixed, the 1980s were the decade when large movements in exchange
rates first became a serious issue in the political arena. For the
first time, currencies claimed their share of space on the
editorial and front pages of American newspapers. For the first
time, Congressmen expostulated on such arcane issues as the
difference between sterilized and unsterilized intervention in the
foreign exchange market, and proposed bills to take some of the
responsibility for exchange rate policy away from the historical
Treasury-Fed duopoly.
The history of the dollar during the decade breaks up fairly
neatly into three phases: 1981-84, when the currency appreciated
sharply against trading partners' currencies, 1985-86, when the
dollar peaked and reversed the entire distance of its ascent, and
1987-90 when the exchange rate fluctuated within a range that --
comparedto the preceding roller coaster ——seemedrelatively
stable.It was of course the unprecedented magnitude of the
upswing from 1980 to February 1985, 59 per cent (logarithmically)
in the Fed's trade—weighted index, that made the exchange rate such
a potent issue. U.S. exporters lost price competitiveness on world
markets, and other U.S. firms faced intensive competition from
cheaper imports. Most analysts considered the appreciation of the
1dollar (allowing for the usual lag of at least twoyears in trade
effects) to be the primary cause of the subsequent deterioration of
the U.S. trade balance, $123 billion from 1982 to 1987.
This paper begins with a review of the history of exchange
rate policy during the 1980s.It then proceeds to discuss the
competing philosophical views, proposals, and economic theories,
and the competing objectives, interest groups and policy—makers,
that went into the determination of policy. Thepaper concludes
with some thoughts on possible generalizationsregarding the
political economy of exchange rates.
It must be acknowledged from the outset that the topic of
"exchange rate policy' differs in at least one fundamentalrespect
from such topics as regulatory or tradepolicy: many economists
believe that there is no such thing as exchange ratepolicy, or, to
be more precise, that there is no independentscope for the
government to affect the exchange rate after taking into account
monetary policy (and perhaps fiscal policy, or some of the
microeconomic policies that are considered by otherpapers in this
conference).
There are, on the other hand,many who believe that such
tools as foreign exchange intervention andcapital controls g
have independent effects on the exchange rate.Everyone agrees,
furthermore, that an announcement by government officialsregarding
a desired path for the exchange rate or regardingpossible changes
in exchange rate regimes (e.g., fixed,vs. pure floating, vs.
managed floating, vs. target zones) can have important effects via
2perceptions by market participants of its implications for future
monetary policy.
If this were a paper on the economics of exchange rate
determination, then it would be central to trytosettle the issue
of whether the money—supply process, and a stable money—demand
relationship, can together explain the exchange rate.But the
assignment here concerns the political process of policy—
determination rather than the economic process of exchange-rate
determination. There is no question that the exchange rate is a
distinct subject for concern, debate, deliberation, and attempted
influence.
In exchange rate policy, as in regulatory policy, "do
nothing" is one of the options for the government. Indeed, as we
shall see, this was the option officially adopted during the first
Reagan Administration, 1981—84. Nevertheless, it is by no means a
foregone conclusion that this option is the one that is most
desirable from an economic standpoint, nor that it is the one that
is likely to prevail for long from a political standpoint.
II. THE CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. EXCHANGE-RATE POLICY IN THE 80S
1. The First Phase of DollarAppreciation:1980-82
The dollar ended the 1970s in the same fashion that it had
started it, by falling in value. The devaluations of 1971 and 1973
had been deliberate attempts to eliminate the accumulating
disequilibrium of the Bretton Woods years. The depreciation of
31977-78 also began with a deliberate attempt by Treasury Secretary
Michael Blumenthal and others in the Carter Administration to "talk
down' the dollar. In the absence of a willingnessamong trading
partners to expand at as rapid a rate as the United States, a
depreciation of the dollar was at the time viewed as the natural
way of staving of f the then-record U.S. trade deficits that were
beginning to emerge. But the decline soon got out of control. The
depreciation of the late 1970s is now usually thought of, in the
economic arena, as a symptom of excessive U.S. monetary expansion,
and, in the political arena as one of many symbols of the "malaise"
that is popularly associated with the Carter Administration.
The reversal of this down-phase in the dollar began, not
with the coming of Ronald Reagan, but rather with themonetary
tightening by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. In October
1979 the Fed announced a change in itsopen market procedures,
designed to combat inflation and motivated partly by the need to
restore the dollar to international respectability.For the
subsequent several years, Voicker showed his determination to let
interest rates rise however far they had to riseto defeat the
inflation of the 1970s. During the 1981-82period, the U.S. long-
term government bond rate averaged 13.3per cent, a two—point
increase relative to 1980. Interest ratesamong a weighted average
of trading partners rose as well, but notby as much: the U.S.
differential averaged 1.9 per cent over 1981-82compared to 0.6 per
cent in 1979-80. The real (that is,inflation-adjusted) interest
rate differential rose evenmore, by between 2 and 3 points,
4depending on the measure of expected inflation used.' The increase
in the relative attractiveness of dollar assets in the eyes of
global investors brought about between 1980 and 1982 an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar by 29 per cent in nominal terms,
and 28 per cent in real terms. Evidence of the textbook-perfect
effects of the monetary contraction was seen not only in the rise
of the dollar, but also more broadly in the recessions of 1980 and
1981-82. The traditional channel of monetary transmission to the
real economy, the negative effect of an increase in interest rates
on the construction industry and other interest-rate-sensitive
sectors, was subsequently joined by the modern channel of
transmission, the negative effect of an increase in the value of
the dollar on export industries and other exchange rate-sensitive
sectors.
2. The Second Phase of Dollar Appreciation: 1983-84
The trough of the recession came at the end of 1982; a
recovery began in 1983 that was both vigorous and destined to be
long-lived.The dollar continued on its previous upward path.
Between 1982 and 1984 it appreciated another 17 percent in nominal
terms and 14 per cent in real terms. The textbooks had no trouble
explaining why global investors continued to find dollar assets
increasingly attractive: the U.S. long—term real interest rate
continued to rise until its peak in mid-1984. The differential
vis-a-vis trading partners during 1983-84 averaged about 1
1Frankel(1985).
5percentage point higher than in the previous two years. Nor did
the textbooks have much trouble explaining the source of this
increase in U.S. real interest rates. As the Reagan Administration
cut income tax rates, indexed tax brackets for inflation, and began
a massive build-up of military spending, the budget deficit rose
from 2 per cent of GNP in the 1970s to 5 per cent of GNP in the
mid-1980s. (The sharp increase in the budget deficit in 1982 could
be largely blamed on the recession. But by 1985 the increase was
mostly structural.)The increased demand for funds that these
deficits represented readily explains the increase in U.S. interest
rates, the inflow of capital from abroad, and the associated
appreciation of the dollar.
At the same time, the effects of the ever-loftier dollar
began to be felt in earnest among those U.S. industries that rely
on exports for customers or that compete with imports. The
affected sectors on the export side included particularly
agriculture, capital goods, and aircraft and other transportation
equipment; on the import side they included textiles, steel,
motorcycles and conswner electronics; and on both sides they
included semiconductors and automobiles. Overall, the effects on
exports and imports added up to a $67 billion trade deficit in
1983, double the record levels of 1987-88.This too was a
prediction of the standard textbook model. The fiscal expansion
was essentially 'crowding out" private spending on American goods,
not only in the interest—rate-sensitive sectors through the
traditional route, but also in the exchange—rate-sensitive sectors
6through the modern route.
3.The Noninterventionist Policy of the First Reagan Administration
Throughout this period, 1981-84, the Reagan Administration
had an explicitly laissez faire (or benign neglect) policy toward
the foreign exchange market. The policy was non-interventionist in
the general sense that the movement of the dollar was not seen as
requiring any sort of government response, or indeed to be a
problem.It was also non—interventionist in the narrower sense
that the authorities refrained from intervening in the foreign
exchange market, that is, from the selling (or buying) of dollars
in exchange for marks, yen or other foreign currencies.The
UnderSecretary for Monetary Affairs, BerylSprinkel,announced in
the third month of the Administration that its intention was not to
undertake such intervention except in the case of "disorderly
markets."Lest anyone think that the qualifying phrase was
sufficiently elastic to include common fluctuations in the exchange
rate, he explained that the sort of example of disorderly markets
that the Administration had in mind was the occasion of the March
1981 shooting and wounding of the President.2 The historical data
reveal that this date was in fact almost the only occasion between
1981 and 1984 when the U.S. authorities intervened in the market.
We shall discuss in Sections III and IV the various
philosophies that gave rise to the laissez-faire stance of the
2 The source here, as formany other points in this paper, is
the excellent study by Destler and Henning (1989, p.20).
7first Reagan Administration. For the moment, let us note that the
matter is somewhat more complicated than a simple case of
government regulation versus the free—market.
For Sprinkel, a long-time member of the monetarist 'Shadow
Open Market Committee' and follower of Milton Friedman, the matter
was a simple case of the virtues of the free market.Under
floating exchange rates, the price of foreign currency is whatever
it has to be to equilibrate the demand and supply of foreign
currency in the market; it is, virtually by definition, the
"correct price." Attempts by the monetary authorities to intervene
in the foreign exchange market to keep the value of thecurrency
artificially high or artificially low are unsound gambles with the
taxpayers' money, as likely to be counterproductive as attempts by
the Department of Agriculture to intervene in the market forgrain
to keep the price of grain artificially high or artificially low.
But there were other free-market conservatives in the
starting team at Treasury, the supply siders, who believed in the
need to stabilize the exchange rate, just as firmly as the
monetarists believed in the desirability of leaving it to be
determined by the market. The issue was settled firmly on the side
of non-intervention by the Secretary, Donald Regan. He had neither
a monetarist nor a supply—sider philosophy (nor, indeed, much of an
economic or philosophic framework of any sort). Regan, rather,saw
the issue more in terms of politics and personalities.In the
absence of any guidance from the White House (and, onexchange rate
policy even more than on other areas of policy, there was in fact
8no guidance forthcoming from the White House3), Regan saw his role
as defending himself and the President from any suggestions that
the status quo with respect to the dollar was a bad thing, or that
it required a response. He subscribed to the "Safe Haven" view
that the pattern of capital inflow, dollar appreciation, and trade
deficit, was the result of the favorable investment climate created
by the Reagan tax cuts and regulatory changes, in opposition to the
textbook view that it was the result of a fiscal expansion and
increase in real interest rates.
When the heads of state of the G-7 countries met at
Williamsburg, Virginia, May 28-30, 1983, the Europeans complained
to Reagan about America's budget deficit and its effects such as
high interest rates.But Reagan and Regan responded that the
strong dollar and U.S. trade deficits were not problems, and in any
case were not due to high interest rates and fiscal expansion.'
Within the first Reagan Administration, the view that the
strong dollar was the result of the differential in real interest
rates was put forward early and often by Martin Feldstein, the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1982 to 1984.
His view was that the source of the increase in real interest rates
was the increase in the federal structural budget deficit and
consequent shortfall of national saving.This explanation was
Donald Regan (1989).
Putnam and Bayne (p.179).
After the Williamsburg Summit, Feldstein told the press
that he hoped that it had increased awareness of the dangers of the
dollar appreciation.
9increasingly accepted as the correct one for the appreciating
dollar and widening trade deficit by other members of the
President's cabinet. Representatives of trading partners'
governments also tended to share this view. But it was rejected by
the Treasury and some White House aides, principally on the grounds
that the emphasis on the "twin deficits" amounted to "selling
short" America and the President's policies. Regan and Feldstein
were frequently described in the press as embattled over the issue.
In February 1984, the annual Economic Report of the
President, the main text of which is in fact always the report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, was submitted to the Congress.
It contained an estimate that the market considered the dollar to
be "overvalued' by more than 30 per cent, and a forecast that as a
consequence the trade deficit would almost double to approximately
$110 billion in 1984, and that the borrowing to finance these
deficits would in 1985 convert the United States from a net
creditor to a net debtor in the international accounts. Regan in
Senate testimony, when asked to reconcile this pessimistic outlook
with his own, more rosy, forecasts, was quoted as saying that as
far as he was concerned, the Senators could throw thereport of the
Council of Economic Advisers into the waste basket.6
6Aspart of the interagency review process in January, Don
Regan had (unsuccessfully) threatened Feldstein that he would tell
the President not to sign the Report if it did not adopt a more
upbeat tone than the existing draft, abandoning its emphasis on the
bad outlook for the trade deficit and its analysis of the dollar as
the major cause of the problem.The text was not altered in
substance. Needless to say, the deficit predictions subsequently
caine true.
10NOMINAL AND PEAL LONG TERM INTEREST RATES
THE DOLLAR AND REAL INTEREST RATES
Percent Index, March 1973—100 (Quarterly)
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Source: Federal Reserve Board macro data base. P. Noopor and C. Mann.
1 Long-term government or public authority bond rates adjusted for oxpectod inflation
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interest ralOs.
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197375 77 79 81 83 85 874. The Yen/Dollar Agreement of 1984
Complaints about the strong dollar and the effect it was
havingon trade were heardincreasingly,however,and
Administration policy—makers became increasingly aware of two
(related) risks: that trade would be a potent weapon that the
Democrats would use in the November 1984 presidential election, and
that such complaints would result in protectionist legislation on
Capitol Hill.In October 1983, therefore, Regan launched the
Yen/Dollar campaign, an attempt to respond to the political issue
of the appreciating dollar and widening trade deficit, without
abandoning the Administration's free-market orientation. (As was
also true later,the Treasury continued to resist the
characterization that the dollar was "too high," and preferred to
say that other currencies —-inthis case the yen ——were"too
low.") Regan, in sub—cabinet and cabinet meetings, succeeded in
setting the request for liberalization as a top U.S. priority in
President Reagan's visit to Japan and meeting with Prime Minister
Nakasone in November 1983.As a result, a working group of
Treasury and Ministry of Finance representatives was formed, and
its work culminated in the Yen/Dollar Agreement of May 1984.
I described in my 1984 study7 how the impetus behind the U.S.
campaign for Japanese liberalization was rooted in what I
considered questionable economic logic on the part of Treasury
Secretary Don Regan. This was the notion that Japanese financial
Published by the Institute for International Economics four
months after I left the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers.
11liberalization would help promote capital flow from the United
States to Japan, rather than the reverse, and would help reduce the
corresponding U.S. trade deficit, through an appreciation of the
yen against the dollar.Regan acquired this theory from an
American businessman, Caterpillar Tractor Chairman Lee Morgan, in
late September 1983. It was not a theory that had previously had
many adherents in the U.S. Government.9
The questionable component of the argument adopted by Regan
was the proposition that the Japanese authorities at the time were
using capital controls or administrative guidance to discourage the
flow of capital into Japan and to depress the value of the yen.
Prohibitions against foreign acquisition of most Japanese assets
did in fact exist in the 1970s, but they were formally eliminated
in the Foreign Exchange Law of December 1980.The de facto
liberalization dated from April 1979.It is evident from a
comparison of the Euroyen and Tokyo short—term interest rates that
8 Morgan based his analysis and recommendations on Murchison
and Solomon (1983).It is quite clear that their goal was
promoting the flow of capital from the United States to Japan,
rather than the reverse;their list of suggested measures for
Reagan to urge on Nakasone included, for example, "An increase in
the Government of Japan's overseas borrowing with the proceeds
converted immediately into yen to assist Japan in financing its
substantial budget deficits" (p.25-27).
Undersecretary Sprinkel had testified as recently as the
preceding April that there was no merit to the theory that the
Ministry of Finance was using capital controls to keep the yen
undervalued. A study by the General Accounting Office released the
same month found the same thing. On the other hand, Secretary of
State George Schultz did in private propose something very much
like the yen/dollar campaign in the summer of 1983.But he
recognized that the State Department was obliged to leave exchange-
rate matters to the Treasury.
12arbitrage was able to eliminate the onshore—offshore differential
that existed prior to that date. In the early 1980s the objective
of the Japanese authorities was, if anything, to dampen the
depreciation of the yen, not to promote it.1° Thus it could have
been predicted (and was predicted: Bergsten, 1984, CEA, 1984, and
Frankel, 1984) that if the Ministry of Finance were to agree to
U.S. demands to avoid any remaining interference with international
financial flows, the impact would be an acceleration of capital
outflow attracted by higher interest rates in the United States,
rather than the reverse.
To be sure, other motives for the liberalization campaign
were very relevant as well. From the beginning, the appeal of the
idea to Don Regan and others in the Administration lay in the
political need to be seen beginning to respond to public and
Congressional concerns over the rising U.S. trade deficit
(particularly in a presidential election year), and the desire to
do so in a way consistent with free-market ideology. As the first
instance of the Treasury attempting to respond to the trade deficit
issue via exchange rate policy, in order to fend offprotectionist
pressures, the Yen/Dollar campaign anticipated the Plaza Accord by
almost two years;to this extent, the plan made perfect sense
10 For evidence that theJapanese government in the early 1980s
sought to resist the depreciation of the yen against the dollar,
not to exacerbate it, see Council of Economic Advisers(1984),
Franke]. (1984, 16—25), Funabashj (1988, 89—92), GAO(1983),and
Haynes, Hutchison, and Mikesell (1986).
13politically. 11
Twovarietiesof the free-market argument are potentially
quite sensible.One is that the point of the exercise was to
promote the internal efficiency of the Japanese economy. This is
apparently one of the things that current U.S. officials have in
mind when they speak of the Yen/Dollar Agreement as having been a
success, and cite it as a model for the 1990 Structural Impediments
Initiative with Japan or Won/Dollar talks with Korea. The typical
reaction of an outsider, however, is that the Japanese would not
appear to need any advice from the United States on how to run
their economy, while the typical reaction of an American would be
that the goal of U.S. policy should be to promote the
competitiveness of the American economy relative to Japan, rather
than the reverse.
The remaining argument is that the point of the campaign was
to promote better treatment in Japan of U.S. banks, securities
companies, and other providers of financial services.Several
measures of this sort indeed appeared on the list that Regan
discussed with Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita November 10, 1983,
on the occasion of President Reagan's visit to Japan, and in the
May 1984 Agreement. This component of the campaign is perfectly
analogous to Reagan Administration pressure on Japan at that time
to allow, for example, the free import of beef and citrus products.
There is no question that the initiation of the Yen/Dollar campaign
'Wedescribe below the switch in Treasury emphasis toward
bringing down the dollar after James Baker succeeded Don Regan as
Secretary in January 1985. See also Funabashi (1988, p.75 ff).
14in October 1983 gained political monientwn when New York financial
institutions responded to a Treasury invitation to contribute a
wish—list of proposed measures. There is also little question that
the measures which were adopted worked on U.S. service exports in
the desired direction.'2 But my claim is that the objective of
helping U.S. providers of financial services was secondary to the
objective of affecting capital flows and the exchange rate.
5. The "Bubble": June 1984-February 1985
From mid-1984 to February 1985 the dollar appreciated
another 20 per cent. This final phase of the currency's ascent
differed from the earlier phases, not only in that the appreciation
was at an accelerated rate, but also in that it could not readily
be explained on the basis of economic fundamentals, whether by
means of the textbook theories or otherwise. The interest rate
differential peaked in June, and thereafter moved in the wrong
2Severalqualifications can be noted.First, measures to
help U.S. financial institutions were not in the interest of U.S.
manufacturing (and for this reason, did not appear in the original
Murchison-Solomon report).Second, in contrast to recent U.S.
efforts to include services in the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, these measures may not have been in the interest of
promoting the existing liberal international trade regime, as they
were negotiated bilaterally and the benefits (such as the decision
by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to make seats available) often accrued
more to U.S. financial institutions than those of third countries.
Third, one variety of the "Yanks hoodwinked again" school argues
that the wily Japanese somehow used liberalization to attain more
benefits for their banks in the United States and Europe than they
granted to U.S. banks operating in Japan. Of course, standard
theories of the "gains from trade's say that both countries can
benefit simultaneously from liberalization.
15direction to explain the remainder of the upswing. Two influential
studies were written, to the effect that the foreign exchange
market had been carried away by an irrational "speculative
bubble'3. The trade deficit reached $112 billion in 1984, and
continued to widen.Many who had hitherto supported freely
floating exchange rates began to change their minds.
Attitudes in the Administration began to shift subtly in one
respect. Treasury officials (both in public and in private) had
previously denied that the large federal budget deficit and trade
deficit were problems, or that the United States was becoming
dependent on the foreign capital inflow to make up the shortfall in
national saving.'4But towards the end of the first Reagan
Administration, these officials began (explicitly) to admit that
the budget deficit was a problem, and (implicitly) to admit that
the country did indeed need to borrow from abroad to finance the
'PaulKrugman(1985)and Stephen Marris(1985).
Contemporaneous statements by economists that the dollar was
greatly overvalued included presentations by Krugman, Bergsten, and
Richard Cooper to a prominent Federal Reserve System conference in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, just one month before the Plaza meeting.
[Another reference on "the dollar as a speculative bubble" that
dates from this year is Frankel and Froot (1990).]
'Some,particularly Destler and Henning (1989, p.29),
attribute the Nay Yen/Dollar Agreement to a desire on the part of
Treasury officials to make it easier for Americans to borrow from
Japan. But this argument dates the borrowing motivation too early
and attributes too much consistency to Treasury behavior. As of
the Spring of 1984, these officials were still claiming that the
U.S. did not need to borrow from abroad to finance a shortfall of
saving. The motivation in the Yen/Dollar Agreement was, rather,
the one noted above: to try to decrease the yen/dollar exchange
rate and reduce the U.S. trade deficit, which is diametrically
opposed to the motivation of increasing the net flow of capital
from Japan to the United States.
16deficits, and they took steps to facilitate such borrowing.In
July 1984, Assistant Secretary David Mulford moved to make it
easier for U.S. corporations to borrow from abroad, by eliminating
the withholding tax on payment of interest to foreign residents,
and allowed bearer bonds to be issued in the Eurornarket.In
September 1984, the Treasury created a new kind of bond that was
specially—targeted so as to appeal to foreign investors, and sent
Undersecretary Sprinkel to Tokyo and various European capitals to
help drum up customers for these bonds. But these measures did not
constitute a decision that the strong dollar and trade deficit
presented a problem. When it was no longer possible to postpone
the choice between allowing the saving shortfall to keep interest
rates high (thereby crowding out the interest—sensitive components
of U.S. demand, so as to protect the exchange—rate-sensitive
components) or allowing it to keep the dollar high (thereby
crowding out net exports, so as to protect the interest—sensitive
sectors), the Regan-Sprinkel team in late 1984 finally opted for
the latter alternative de facto. Indeed the increase in
attractiveness of U.S. assets that was brought about by the July
policy changes by Treasury furnishes virtually the only change in
economic fundamentals that could conceivably help explain the
appreciation of the dollar over this period when interest rates
were falling.
6. The Plaza Sea—Change: 1985
The pivotal event in the making of exchange rate policy in
17the 1980s was the shift from a relatively doctrinaire laissez-faire
policy during the first Reagan Administration, to a more flexible
policy of activism during the second Administration.We will
consider in later sections the extent to which economics, politics,
and personalities combined to produce this shift, and the extent to
which the shift in policy was in turn responsible for the reversal
of the dollar's appreciation.
An obvious point from which to date the switch is September
22, 1985, when Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors from
the G-5 countries met at the Plaza Hotel in New York arid agreed to
try to bring the dollar down.15ThePlaza Accord was certainly the
embodiment of the new regime. But I would prefer to date the start
of the new era from the beginning of that year.With the
inauguration of the second Reagan Administration, Don Regan and
Beryl Sprinkel left the Treasury (for the White House and Council
of Economic Advisers, respectively). James Baker became Secretary
of the Treasury, and his aide Richard Darman became Deputy
Secretary.16 Both men had already developed at the White House a
15Thestory of the Plaza is described in detail in Funabashi
(1988, pp.9—41).
16TheDeputy Secretary job that Darman took had previously
been occupied by Tim McNamar. (McNainar did not quite have either
Spririkel's zeal for free—market ideology nor Regan's zeal for the
exercising of power, and in any case did not play a central role on
exchange rate policy.) The position of Undersecretary for Monetary
Affairs was not filled after Sprinkel's departure. Thus Darsuan de
facto succeeded Sprinkel in the area of exchange rate policy.
David Mulford continued in the next-lower rank as Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs throughout the remainder of the
Second Reagan Administration (and was eventually promoted to a new
position of Under Secretary for International Affairs in the Bush
Administration).
18reputation for greater pragmatism than other more ideological
members of the Administration. In January confirmation hearings,
Baker explicitly showed signs of the departure with respect to
exchange rate policy, stating at one point that the Treasury's
previous stance against intervention was 'obviously something that
should be looked at.. ."'7
Another reason to date the change from early in the year is
that the dollar peaked in February, and had already depreciated by
13 per cent by the time of the Plaza meeting.Some (such as
Feldstein) would argue that the gap in timing shows that exchange
rate "policy" in fact has little connection with the actual
determination of the exchange rate, which is instead determined in
the private marketplace regardless of what efforts governmentsmay
make to influence it.But, notwithstanding that official policy
did not change until September,'8 there are two respects in which
the bursting of the bubble at the end of Februarymay have been in
part caused by policy change.
First, it was widely anticipated that Baker and Darman would
probably be more receptive to the idea of trying to bring down the
dollar than their predecessors had been. As the theory of rational
expectations says, if market participants have reason to believe
that policy changes to reduce the value of the dollar will be made
Destler and Henning (1989, p.41-42).
'° A June 1985meeting of G—1O Deputies in Tokyo, for example,
concluded that there was no need for internationalmonetary reform, and also endorsed the 1983 finding of theJurgensen Report that
intervention did not offer a very useful tool to affectexchange
rates. (Obstfeld, 1990, and Dobson, 1990, p.27.)
19in the future, they will move to sell dollars today in order to
protect themselves against future losses, which will have the
effect of causing the dollar to depreciate today.
Second, some intervention was agreed upon at a G—5 meeting
in London attended by Baker and Darman on January 17, and did take
place subsequently.'9 The U.S. intervention was small in
magnitude.20 But the German monetary authorities, in particular,
intervened heavily to sell dollars in foreign exchange markets in
February and March.2' They, like monetary authorities in other G-7
countries, had largely discontinued efforts to dampen the
appreciation of the dollar earlier, in the absence of a willingness
to cooperate on the part of the United States.The February
intervention was reported in the newspapers, and by virtue of
timing appears a likely candidate for the instrument that pricked
the bubble. It is in turn likely that the accession of Baker to
the Treasury in January and the London G-5 meeting were the
developments that encouraged the Germans to renew their
Funabashi (1988, p.10).Surprisingly, the G-5 public
announcement on January 17 used language that, on the surface at
least, sounds more pro—intervention than was used later in the
Plaza announcement: the G-5 "in light of recent developments in
foreign exchange markets, reaffirmed their commitment made at the
Williamsburg Summit to undertake coordinated intervention in the
markets as necessary."
20 A total of $659 million in foreignexchange purchases from
Jan. 21 to March 1, as compared to $10 billion by the major central
banks in total. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York quarterly Review
10, Spring 1985, p.60; and Autumn, p.52.)
21
Intervention was particularly strong on February 27, and
appeared to have an impact on the market.(E.g., Wall Street
Journal 9/23/85, p.26.)
20appreciation of the non-dollar currencies is desirable,' and that
they "stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when
to do so would be helpful," language that by the standards of such
communiques is considered (at least in retrospect) to have
constituted strong support for concerted intervention, even though
the word "intervention" did not appear. A figure of 10-12 per cent
depreciation of the dollar over the near term had been specified as
the aim in a never—released "non—paper" drafted by Mulford for a
secret preparatory meeting of G-5 Deputies in London on September
15, and (according to American government sources) was accepted as
the aim by the G—5 Ministers at the Plaza.24 There was,
apparently, little discussion among the participants as to whether
changes in monetary policy would be required to achieve the aim of
depreciating the dollar.
On the Monday that the Plaza announcement was made public,
the dollar fell a sudden four per cent against a weighted average
of other currencies (slightly more against the mark and yen).
Subsequently, it resumed a gradual depreciation at a rate similar
24The"non—paper" also specified the total scale of
intervention to be undertaken over the subsequent six weeks (up to
$18 billion), and the allocation among the five countries.
(Funabashi, 1988, pp.l6—21.) Intervention actually undertaken by
the end of October turned out to be $3.2 billion on the part of the
United States and $5 billion on the part of the other four
countries, plus over $2 billion on the part of G—lO countries that
were not represented at the Plaza, particularly Italy.(Federal
Reserve Sank of New York Quarterly Review 10, Winter 1985-86,
p.47.)
22to that of the preceding seven months.25 Interest rates continued
to decline gradually, despite fears of Voicker and many others that
a depreciation might discourage international investors from
holding dollars and thereby force interest rates up.26Before
long, the Plaza had widely become considered a great public
success.
7. The Apotheosis of International Coordination: 1986
Baker's ambitions for joint international policy-making
concerned more than just exchange rates. His efforts to get Japan,
Germany and other trading partners to agree to expand their
economies go back to negotiations leading up to the Plaza.27 At
the next Summit of G-7 heads of state, held in Tokyo in May 1986,
the U.S. persuaded the others to adopt a system of so-called
"objective indicators.'The list of indicators included: the
growth rate of GNP, the interest rate, the inflation rate, the
unemployment, the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GNP, the current
account and trade balances, the money growth rate, and
international reserve holdings, in addition to the exchange rate.
The plan was to expand the existing G-5 Finance Ministers'meetings
25Becausethe rate of depreciation after the Plaza, excluding
that four per cent drop, was no greater than before thePlaza,
Feldstein (1986) argued that the change in policy had no effect.
This logic is far from conclusive, however.
26Therole of Voicker and monetary policy during this period
is discussed in Part VII of the paper.
27Funabashi(1988, pp.11-12, 36-38), Putnam and Bayne (1987,
p.205), and Wall Street Journal 9/23/85, p1,25.
23to include Italy and Canada, and to agree in each meeting on a set
of quantitative predictions/goals for each of the indicator
variables. At subsequent meetings, each of the seven economies'
performances would be judged against those goals. In the words of
the Tokyo Economic Declaration, the Finance Ministers and Central
Bankers would "make their best efforts to reach an understanding on
appropriate remedial measures whenever there are significant
deviations from an intended course."
Mulford, as an unnamed Treasury source, indicated to the
press that G—7 members were supposed to feel substantive "peer
pressure" to modify their policies so as to meet the agreed—upon
goals. The other countries suspected that the U.S. Treasury's aim
insetting up this system was to pressure them into greater
economic expansion, as a way for the United States to reduce its
trade deficit without itself having to undertake unpleasant fiscal
retrenchment. The Germans spoke out against the "robotization" of
international policy-making.
The maneuvering that went on outside G-7 meetings in 1986
was more substantive than the maneuvering that went on inside.
Baker was repeatedly quoted in the press as "talking the dollar
down," in large part as a weapon to induce the trading partners to
cut interest rates. This was a tack very much reminiscent of an
earlier Treasury Secretary, Blumenthal. The pitch went something
like: "We would prefer that you expand your economies and thereby
import more from us, so that reduction of the U.S. deficit can be
achieved in a way consistent with growth for all parties. But if
24you are not willing to go along, then I am afraid we are just going
to have to let the dollar depreciate more, in which case your
exports to us will fall."
The Germans and Japanese intervened in the foreign exchange
market to try to support the dollar, but complained that "these
efforts were in vain, not least because statements by U.S.
officials repeatedly aroused the impression on the markets that the
U.S. authorities wanted the dollar to depreciate further.
Moreover, until then [the Louvre Accord in late January 1987J the
Americans hardly participated in the operations to support their
currency."28 Meanwhile, Fed Chairman Voicker was also being quoted
as favoring the current level for the exchange rate, in apparent
opposition to Baker.
By September 1986, the yen/dollar rate had declined from its
peak of 260, to about 154. Japanese exporters were feeling heavily
squeezed.At a secret rendezvous in San Francisco, Japanese
Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa met with Baker.They made a deal
under which the exchange rate would be stabilized in itscurrent
range, and in return the Japanese would undertake greater fiscal
expansion. The agreement was not announced until October. In the
interim the yen had depreciated back to about 162Y/$. The
Americans suspected the Japanese of deliberatemanipulation so as
to lock in a more favorable rate, and returned totalking down the
dollar. This episode is an example of thedifficulty of enforcing
28Reportof the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Year 1986,p.63, quoted by Obstfeld (1988, p.48).
25an international cooperative agreement if its terms are not made
explicit and public from the beginning to allow participants and
outside observers to judge compliance.
8. The Louvre Accord and the Return of Dollar Stability
The next meeting of G-7 Finance Ministers was held at the
Louvre in Paris on February 21-22, 1987.The Baker-Miyazawa
agreement proved to be something of a dry run for the Louvre
Agreement. The ensuing communique showed that the U.S. had agreed
that the dollar should be stabilized "around current levels," and
in return Japan had agreed to expand domestic demand in general,
and Germany and some of the others had agreed more narrowly to cut
taxes. One interpretation as to why Germany and the others were
willing to participate at the Louvre when they had not been
earlier, is that the Baker—Miyazawa Agreement demonstrated the
readiness of the U.S. and Japan to proceed with a G—2," and the
Germans and others did not want to be left out.29
Twoquestionsof importance for evaluating the Louvre
Agreement concern quantitative bands and intervention. The
29 Standard economic theories of the gains from coordination
do not readily explain why a country should mind if other countries
enter into an agreement without it.(Indeed, in many cases, the
excluded countries should in theory be able to reap the benefits
from worldwide economic expansion, enhanced monetary stability, or
some other "public good," without having to bear any of the
burden.) But there may be some loss of political power or prestige
from being left out, because it is a commonly-expressed subject of
concern. Italy, which at the Tokyo Summit of May 1986 had won an
expansion of the G-5 ministers group to the G—7, refused to join in
the Louvre communique, in protest against its exclusion from an
informal G-5 meeting that had already worked out the Louvre Accord.
26communique that was released after the meeting, as with all G—7
meetings, contained little hard information and conveyed the major
policy change with a few understated words: "The Ministers and
Governors agreed that the substantial exchange rate changes since
the Plaza Agreement will increasingly contribute toreducing
external imbalances and have now brought their currencies within
ranges broadly consistent with underlying economic
fundamentals.. .Further substantial exchange rate shiftsamong their
currencies could damage growth and adjustmentprospects in their
countries." As with the Plaza Accord, participants denied to the
press that any specific quantitative target range had been set.3°
Subsequent newspaper reports spoke of the range or target zone that
had been set at the Louvre and madeguesses as to what it might be.
Most knowledgeable observers surmised thatprobably no explicit
quantitative range had in fact been agreedupon. This view was
overturned, however, when Funabashi (1988, pp. 183-87)reported
that the Louvre participants had after all seta "reference range"
of 5 per cent around the current level.3'
The advantage of having kept thetarget range secret was
borne out when the dollar broke Out of thelower end of the range.
°WallStreet Journal 2/23/87, p.3.
31Moreprecisely: a narrower margin of plus—or-minus 2 1/2 %, afterwhich point intervention would be called foron a voluntary
basis, and a wider margin of plus—or—minus 5%,atwhich point a
collaborative policy response would beobligatory. Such meetings
are notorious for each country emerging with itsown view as to
what was agreed upon, and there isalways the possibility that the
5 per cent target range was a u.s.proposalabout which some
countries, such as Germany, were unenthusiastic.No legal or
quasi—legal documents are signed at such meetings.
27By April of 1987, the scheduled time of a G-7 meeting, the
yen/dollar rate had fallen 7 per cent from the Louvre baseline.
The Japanese Finance Minister, Miyazawa, was forced to accept
Baker's proposal to "rebase" at the current level of 146
yen/dollar, with the same width of the reference range bands as
before.
The U.S. commitment at the Louvre to oppose further
depreciation of the dollar might be supposed to show up in three
ways, besides the announcement of the agreement itself: an absence
of statements by the Secretary of the Treasury "talking down the
dollar," purchases of dollars in foreign exchange intervention
operations, and a tighter monetary policy. From then on, Baker did
indeed refrain, for the most part, from talking down the dollar.
For the first time since the heavy dollar sales of 1985, the U.S.
also did indeed intervene substantially in the foreign exchange
market in the aftermath of the Louvre, buying dollars to discourage
further depreciation.Finally, U.S. interest rates did indeed
begin a gradual rise in February (reversing a three—year downward
trend), although the Federal Reserve was motivated more by a desire
to choke off inflation, which was beginning to edge up slightly
again, than by a feeling of commitment to support the value of the
dollar.Perhaps as a result of these three steps, the dollar
appreciated, particularly against the mark, from the date of the
Louvre until mid—March (at one point inducing a small amount of Fed
intervention in March to dampen the appreciation).
289. The Financial Markets Fear a Dollar Plunge: 1987
Many analysts had been warning for some time of the
possibility of a "hard landing," which could be defined as a fall
in the dollar which, because it is caused by a sudden portfolio
shift out of dollar assets, is accompanied by a sharp increase in
interest rates that have a contráctionary effect on economic
activity.32 Two events shook financial markets in 1987; each of
them began with markings of such a portfolio shift. First, in the
Spring, a fall in demand for U.S. bonds, perhaps led by nervous
foreign investors, led to a depreciation of the dollar (despite
concerted intervention in support of the dollar), and an abrupt
decline in bond prices and increase in interest rates.
Second, world stock markets crashed in October 19, 1987. Of
the various possible causes that have been proposed for the
bursting of the apparent bubble, several are international in
nature. By the Fall of 1987, the U.S. trade deficit had still not
improved,33 and Jim Baker was again hoping to convince the largest
trading partners to expand their economies. On October 15, the
Commerce Department reported an unexpectedly large August trade
deficit, and the New York stock market reacted with a then—record
32E.g.,Marris (1985). This was also a major concern of Paul
Voicker' s.
In retrospect, the trough in the dollar trade deficit
occurred in the third quarter of 1987 (and the trough in the "real
trade deficit," that is the quantity of exports minus the quantity
of imports, in the third quarter of 1986).
2995 point f all.34 On October 18, Baker again called on the German
Minister, Stoltenberg, to undertake expansion, with renewed dollar
depreciation as the threatened alternative.When the U.S. and
other stock markets crashed on the next day (508 points in the case
of New York), two possible causes that were identified were the
October 14 trade deficit announcement, and Baker's threat to the
Germans to let the dollar fall. A third hypothesis is that the
markets feared that the Fed would deliberately raise interest rates
to try to keep the dollar from falling through a floor set at the
Louvre .
Manyobservers on October 19 at first feared that the hard
landing was at hand. But, in large part due to the rapid reaction
of the Federal Reserve, interest rates fell rather than rose and
there was no subsequent slowdown in economic activity. The Fed was
prepared to allow a sharp decline in the dollar if the alternative
were insufficient liquidity to avert a financial crisis (though the
dollar, surprisingly, did not depreciate on October 19).
Consultationsamongthevariousgovernmentsbegan
Other immediate market reactions that day included a decline
in the dollar and an increase in short—term interest rates,
precisely as in the portfolio-shift/hard--landing scenario. (Wall
Street Journal 11/5/87, p/22.)
"Feldstein(1988) and Obstfeld (1988, p.53). This
explanation was partly inspired by Chairman Greenspan's move to
raise interest rates earlier in the year.But Greenspan's
motivation was more likely to respond to incipient signs of re—
emerging inflation, particularly to demonstrate his independence
from the Administration and to earn his tough-guy credentials in
the eyes of the market soon after his appointment to replace Paul
Voicker, than it was to meet any exchange rate commitment made by
Baker at the Louvre.
30immediately, but in the absence of a clear idea as to what
macroeconomic policy commitments could be made, with respect to
U.S. fiscal policy in particular, no G—7 meeting was scheduled.
Dollar depreciation was again a concern, with frequent intervention
in support of the dollar having little apparent effect. Two months
after the stock market crash, G-7 representatives decided ina
"Telephone Accord' to try to breathe new life into the Louvre
agreement.Paragraph 8 of their December 22, 1987, communique
(which the G—7 leaders were later to repeat word-for—word in the
communique of the Toronto Summit in June 1988) modified slightly
earlier statements in favor of exchange ratestability. It
included new wording: 'either excessive fluctuation ofexchange
rates, a further decline of the dollar or a rise in the dollar to
an extent that becomes destabilizing to the adjustmentprocess,
could be counterproductive.. 'Theasymmetry of the language,
describing the undesirability of a rise in a more qualifiedway
than the undesirability of a fall, was a deliberatesignal that the
group wanted to put a floor under the dollar at its current level.
The markets were initially unimpressed, butheavy around—the—clock
intervention in support of the dollar37 inJanuary 1988 was
apparently quite effective at combatting dollar weakness.
36 Dobson (1990,Table 2.3), and New York Times, 1/8/88, p.26.
Called the "G-7 bear trap" by Destler andHenning (1989, p.66).The intent of the intervention was to"bridge" until
substantial improvements in the U.S. trade deficitmaterialized, at
which time market sentiment in favor of the dollarcould take over.
In the event, this plan worked quite well.(Dobson, 1990, pages 2.30 and 3.22.)
31Periodically in 1987 and 1988, Japan's Ministry of Finance
used administrative guidance to encourage Japanese institutional
investors to hold more U.S. assets than they might choose on
profit-maximizing grounds, in order to keep the dollar from
depreciating further than it already had by then. This happened,
in particular, in response to the U.S. bond-market fall in the
Spring of 1987.Koo (1988, p.8) tells us: "Even though the
imposition of such quasi-capital controls [reporting-requirements
for Japanese banks handling foreign exchange --andan implicit
threat behind them —-imposedin May 1987 to head off a dollar
collapse] was against the spirit of the Yen/Dollar Committee
sponsored jointly by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the US
Treasury to deregulate Japanese financial markets, no complaints
were heard from the US."38
10. Dollar Rallies: 1988 and 1989
The dollar began to appreciate after the intervention of
January 1988. Its strength in mid-1988, leading up to the November
presidential election, led some observers to suggest that the
authorities in Japan and Germany were supporting the U.S. currency
in order to help candidate George Bush win the election and thus
head of f the danger of protectionist trade policies under the
Democrats.
A new dollar rally followed in 1989.For the first time
since 1985-86, the official message switched from a desire for
38Seealso Hale (1989, pp.2—4).
32'exchange rate stability around recent levels" back to an
implication that the current strength of the dollar was not
justified:39 In the communique of a Washington meeting in September
1989, the G-7 "...considered the rise in recent months of the
dollar inconsistent with longer run fundamentals." But there is
less evidence in 1989 that foreign exchange intervention succeeded
in moving the market than there was in the 1985—88 period.
The yen, in particular, weakened against the dollar at the
end of the decade, in association with political scandals inJapan
in 1989 and an investor shift out of Japanese security markets in
early 1990.Japanese officials apparently thought that, having
supported the U.S. currency earlier, the Americans should now
return the favor and support the yen. U.S. authorities had bought
yen and marks in 1988 and 1989 to dampen the appreciation of the
dollar. But a Paris G-7 meeting in early April of 1990produced no
support for Japan (beyond a statement that the Ministers had
"discussed.. .thedecline of the yen against other currencies, and
its undesirable consequences for the globaladjustment process"40).
11. Exchange Rates Policies in Other Parts of theWorld
Most political discussion of "the dollar" does not bother to
distinguish what partner currencies are intended, or what their
relative weight is in the basket. Some standardweighted average
of the major industrialized countries isusually used when precise
Dobson (1990, p. 22).
40Dobson,Table 2.3.
33numbers are needed, while the mark and -—especially—-theyen
often come in for extra attention, by virtue of the importance of
Germany and Japan in international trade and finance. The lack of
American concern with other currencies stems in part because the
various dollar exchange rates are highly correlated, and in part
because the less—important currencies are considered esoteric in
the U.S. political sphere.4' Nevertheless, some specific issues
concerning other currencies did arise in the 1980s, and are worth
mentioning both as they relate to the dollar and to the extent that
they shed light on American thinking regarding foreign exchange
markets in general.
First, after the LDC debt crisis surfaced in August 1982, it
became necessary for many countries in Latin America and elsewhere
to take policy steps to convert their existing trade deficits into
trade surpluses, and thereby earn the foreign exchange to service
their international debts. High on the usual list of such policy
steps is the devaluation of the currency.The Mexican peso,
Brazilian cruzeiro (later the cruzado), Argentine peso (later the
austral), and many others underwent repeated large nominal and real
devaluations. For the most part these devaluations were components
of policy packages taken under the guidance, indeed insistence, of
the International Monetary Fund and with the full support of the
U.S. government.But demurs were occasionally heard from two
different sources within the U.S. political galaxy. A few U.S.
'Recallthe famous quote from the Nixon tapes, "I don't give
a ____aboutthe lira.H
34industries that faced competition from these countries charged that
the devaluations represented subsidies or other unfair trading
practices, and were sometimes supported in these charges by
protectors in the Commerce Department or in the Congress.(An
example was charges by the U.S. copper industry that they faced
unfair competition from Chile in the form of a devaluation of the
Chilean peso.)
The other source of protest was more philosophical than
political: the "supply—siders" argued that devaluation, like fiscal
austerity (the twin officially-sanctioned policy for problem
debtors), was not an effective or desirable way to improve the
trade balance, because it had no real effects. The supply—sider
viewpoint deserves attention ——iffor no other reason —-because
it was represented in the Reagan Administration, especially at the
beginning, with sufficient vigor (for example) to produce the 1981-
83 tax cuts.
Another major non—dollar currency development of the l980s
was the movement toward enhanced monetary and financial unification
within Europe. The founding of the EuropeanMonetary System by
Giscard and Schmidt in 1979 had been portrayed at the timeas
something of a challenge to the primacy of the dollar, and policy
toward the EMS at the U.S. Treasury had been at best neutral.42
But when "Europe 1992" frenzy caught fire inEurope in 1988 and
generated some fears of a Fortress Europe in the American Congress,
media, and business communities, the attitude of the Administration
42Funabashi(p.31) explains views within the Treasury.
35ranged from indifferent to benign.This benign indifference
particularly characterized the decade's developments on the
monetary side: France's retreat from the go—it-alone expansion and
controls on capital outflow that the Socialists had instituted in
1981, the agreement by EMS members to phase out all capital
controls by July 1990, and the completely unanticipated decision by
East and West Germany in 1990 to undertake monetary unification.43
All three events tended to be welcomed as further signs of the
worldwide free-market revolution that Ronald Reagan had helped
start.
The Europeans, however, often feel that the U.S. policy—
makers are insufficiently appreciative of EMS concerns, for example
of the way that the long-awaited depreciation of the dollar in 1985
might put strains on the cross—rates between the deutschemark and
the weaker currencies in the EMS. After the Plaza Accord, Treasury
officials thought that the Germans had not done their agreed-upon
share of intervention. (This view was expressed by Mulford at a G—
5 Deputies meeting in Paris in November 1985.)The Germans
explained that the Bank of Italy had sold over $2 billion in place
of the Bundesbank so as to avoid putting upward pressure on the
lira/mark cross rate; they considered American reluctance to accept
this explanation to be a sign of indifference to the EMS.44
A third area of the world that featured interesting exchange
One striking development of 1990 that was presumably in
large part a consequence of the fall of Communism in Central Europe
was the appreciation of the mark and other European currencies.
"Funabashi(pp.27-30).
36rate developments was the East Asian NICs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore). Here U.S. policy played a determining role.In
1986 and 1987 there became fashionable the view that the
explanation for the lack of improvement in the U.S. trade balance
since February 1985 was that the traditional indices of the U.S.
"effective exchange rate" vastly overstated the depreciation of the
dollar that had taken place, by giving excessive weight to the yen
and European currencies: that such trading partners as the East
Asian NICs, Brazil and Mexico (newly-important competitors in
manufactures) and Argentina, Australia and Canada (traditional
competitors in wheat and beef in third-country markets) had little
or no representation in the indices, and that their currencies had
jjappreciatedagainst the dollar.45
The two countries that came in for particular attention were
Korea and Taiwan. (Singapore and Hong Kong were relativelyexempt
from criticism because both follow free-trade policies. The Latin
American countries had the excuse of difficult debts to service.)
As of 1986, the new Taiwan dollar had only begun toappreciate
against the U.S. dollar, and the Korean won still had not begun to
do so, even though both countries had large tradesurpluses. The
U.S. government soon began to applypressure on the two (as Fred
Certain economists initially overstated the case by
including the Latin American countries in a comprehensive nominal
exchange rate index and proclaiming that the depreciation of the
dollar had in fact not taken place I A properly computed
comprehensive real exchange rate index shows that the 1985—87
depreciation of the dollar was less than one would think if the
other countries were not included, but that the difference isnot
large.
37Bergsten first urged in Seoul in July 1986), and the currencies
were in fact allowed to appreciate relatively strongly.In the
periodic reports to Congress required by the Omnibus Trade Bill of
1988, the Treasury focused heavily on Korea and Taiwan. In the
October 1989 report, the Treasury announced the beginning of
negotiations that went beyond simply pressuring Korea to appreciate
the won, to push for a general liberalization of Korean financial
markets and conversion to a market—oriented foreign exchange
system, presumably meaning a regime of free—floating.'6 There was
a general appeal to the superiority of free-market principles and
a citation of the precedent of the Yen/Dollar talks.
III. COMPETING ECONOMIC THEORIES
Policies that are adopted are naturally the outcome of the
positions held by various interest groups and policy—makers, and
their interactions through the political process and their relative
power.The last part of this paper discusses the competing
interest groups and policy—makers. The middle part discusses the
various possible positions regarding exchange rate policy among
which they choose. In the area of exchange rates, the links from
policy tools to the determination of the exchange rate, and even
46 The Treasury considers as a deadline for these talks to bear
fruit December 1990, when a Treasury report on the treatment of
U.S. financial institutions in countries like Korea is due to
Congress. Frankel (1990).
38the links from the exchange rate to the economic welfare of various
groups, are not entirely certain. For this reason, the differing
models, or views as to how the foreign exchange market (and the
rest of the economy) operate, can be as relevant as differing
economic interests in determining the positions taken by various
actors.Thus we begin with a brief discussion of alternative
exchange rate theories.
1. Trade Balance Equilibration
A regime of purely-floating exchange rates has held roughly
for the United States since 1973, and held precisely in the early
1980s. Under such a regime, the exchange rate is determined in the
private market, and adjusts to clear supply and demand for foreign
exchange without any intervention by the monetary authority. An
old-fashioned view of exchange-rate determination is that the
supply and demand for foreign exchange are dominated by exports and
imports(respectively),so that under floating rates the exchange
rate adjusts so as to clear the trade balance.What makes this
view old-fashioned is that foreign exchange markets today are
dominated by financial transactions, rather than by trade, and have
been ever since the major industrialized countries removed their
major controls on the international flow of capital. The
importance of international capital flows explains why the record
U.S. trade deficits of the mid-1980s did not immediately produce an
equilibrating depreciation of the dollar: the deficits were easily
financed by massive borrowing from abroad. Some observers,
39however, professed to be surprised by this development, and argued
that the magnitude of the U.S. trade deficit in itself was evidence
that floating exchange rates were not operating "as they were
supposed to," and that some reform was therefore called for.47
One consequence of the trade balance equilibration view is
the implication that if one country adopts a policy change that
differs from that of its neighbors (e.g., the fiscal expansion
adopted by the United States in the 1980s), under a floating
exchange rates the effects are felt entirely within the domestic
economy, rather than being in part transmitted abroad, e.g., via a
domestic trade deficit and foreign trade surplus. It would in turn
follow that under floating rates there is little need for
international coordination of macroeconomic policy of the sort
agreed upon at the Louvre.
Large international capital flows are the most important of
several ways in which this old—fashioned insulation" result can be
invalidated. Nevertheless, for the case of changes in monetary
policy, leading multi-country econometric models suggest that it is
inpractice not far wrong to think that the exchange rate adjusts
so as to produce little effect on the trade balance and little
internationaltransmission.48For fiscal policy, on the other
hand, the trade balance and transmission effects are typically even
greater under floating exchange rates than under fixed rates. Thus
it is no surprise that record U.S. trade deficits and European
'E.g.,Nurchison and Solomon (1983).
48Frankel(1988).
40trade surpluses emerged beginning in 1983, nor that calls for
international coordination of policy followed.
2. Nonetarism
For many, the most common—sensical modern view of
international monetary economics was that of the monetarists.
Among the relevant tenets of monetarism are: (i) belief in the
central role of the money supply, particularly fordetermining the
price level and exchange rate, (ii) a strong preference for low and
stable growth in the money supply, so as togive price stability,
(iii) suspicion of the motives and abilities of the Federal Reserve
Board and an axiomatic belief that thecountry is more likely to
get the proper sort of monetary policy if the Fed isbrought more
directly under the control of the politicalprocess (i.e., Congress
or the Treasury), (iv) faith in free markets ingeneral, (v)
extension of the free-market philosophy to include thevirtues of
a freely-floating exchange rate, so thatany country that prints
too much money has to bear the burden itself interms of inflation
and currency depreciation.This last, the belief in floating
exchange rates, was a position that Milton Friedman(1953) had
advanced almost alone, at a time when sucha change in the exchange
rate regime seemed a remote pipe—dream.
The monetarists entered the l980sriding high. Largely as
a response to the inflation of the l970s, and theother failures of
Keynesian economics, the views of Milton Friedmanand his followers
had gone from those of an outlandishminority to wide acceptance,
41and had supposedly been adopted as official policy by the Federal
Reserve Board. At long last, a member of the Shadow Open Market
Committee, Beryl Sprinkel, was appointed UnderSecretary for
Monetary Affairs (1981—84), the position in the Treasury that
traditionally has had responsibility not only for monetary affairs
but the exchange rate and other matters of international finance as
well, and another, William Poole, was appointed to the President's
Council of Economic Advisers (1982—85).
It was downhill from there. Intellectually, the monetarists
were soon faced with the breakdown of their most cherished
relationship, that between money and prices.The big fall in
velocity in the early 1980s caused the Federal Reserve Board to
abandon its monetarist rule (in mid—1982 de facto, and several
years later explicitly). Politically, their champion Sprinkel, who
duly lectured the Fed from 1983 to 1986 that its rapid rate of
money growth would soon produce a resurgence of inflation, was
overruled by the Secretary of the Treasury who sought to pressure
the Fed for faster growth, for the usual reasons of political
expediency (particularly in the election year, 1984). This
spectacle must have been an edifying lesson for the monetarists on
the political economy of monetary policy.(Refer back to tenet
(iii) above.)
Sprinkel in interagency meetings and public appearances
tried to explain the appreciation of the dollar as due to the
Administration's success at bringing down the rate of inflation.
Such a factor could explain a nominal appreciation, but not the
42real appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s, which was
almost as big as the nominal appreciation. Nor for that matter,
could the monetarist view explain the clear observed increase in
real interest rates. With both the relationship between money and
prices and the relationship between the price level and the
exchange rate breaking down, the monetarists were in heavy retreat
by the latter part of the decade. Sprinkel was not happy with the
Treasury's 1985 conversion to managed exchange rates, but by then
he was not in a position to affect policy on that topic.
3. Overshooting
The theory that could readily explain an increase in the
real interest rate and a real appreciation of the dollar was the
mainstream textbook macroeconomic view subscribed to by Feldstein
and Volcker, among others. As explained in Part II above, the two
variables are closely associated: the increase in the real interest
differential signals an increase in the expected rate of return on
dollar securities; international investors respond to the enhanced
attractiveness of dollar securities by increasing their demand for
them, which causes the dollar to appreciate. The elegant seminal
statement of this process was the overshooting model of Dornbusch
(1976). In the overshooting equilibrium, everyone in the market
agrees that the dollar has become "overvalued" in the sense that
its current value is greater than its long—run value and it will
have to depreciate in the future; the market's expectation that the
dollar will depreciate in the future is just sufficient to offset
43the higher interest rate that dollar assets pay, so that investors
view dollar and non—dollar securities as equally attractive in this
equilibrium.
The overshooting model had some major difficulties of its
own. Although the model could account for the fact of the dollar
appreciation, and for the magnitude (at least as of early 1984), it
could not explain the duration of the appreciation, a long drawn—
out process that lasted until February 1985.In theory, the
appreciation should have occurred in one jump (e.g., when the
magnitude of the budget deficits became known), or in two jumps
(e.g., beginning with the monetary contraction of 1980), or at most
in four or five jumps (as bits of information on the
monetary/fiscal policy mix came out). It should then have begun
its gradual return to long run equilibrium.As described in
section 11.5 above, from mid-1984 on the dollar, far from beginning
its return to long—run equilibrium, continued to appreciate at an
accelerated rate, in the face of not only an ever—worsening trade
balance, but of a real interest differential that had begun to
diminish as well. It appeared that the dollar was overshooting
the overshooting equilibrium."This was definitely fl how
floating exchange rates were supposed to behave, and observers
increasingly began considering alternatives.
4. New classical
It was clear that the last 20 per cent real appreciation of
the dollar up to February 1985 could not be correlated withreadily
44observable, standard, macroeconomic fundamentals. That left two
possibilities. The first theory, coming from the new classical
macroeconomic school, says that movements in the real exchange rate
come from fundamental shifts in "tastes and technology" thatmay
not be observable. Though most proponents of the new classical
school are notorious for omitting to suggest what thespecific
fundamental shifts might be in any particular episode, others have
suggested that Reagan reductions in tax rates, especially on
capital income, could be the explanation behind the appreciation of
the dollar in the early l98Os.'
This school of thought provides the mostrespectable
intellectual foundation for the "Safe Haven' view of thestrong
dollar that was so prevalent in the first Reagan Administration.
But many observers find it implausible that there could have been
a shift in taste toward American goods or an increase ir U.S.
productivity, or tax effects, sufficiently large to explain an
upswing in the value of the dollar as large as that from mid-1984
to February 1985, only to be reversedrapidly thereafter.
5. Speculative bubbles
The second possibility is that the finalstage of
appreciation of the dollar to February 1985 was anexample of a
speculative bubble: a self—confirming increase in the value of the
dollar arising from purchases of dollarsby speculators who think
For example, Dooley and Isard (1985) andBovenberg (1990). This view was also put forward by CEA membersNiskanen and Poole in
the 1985 Economic Report of the President.
45it will appreciate. The standard theory of speculative bubbles has
the advantage that it can be perfectly consistent with rational
expectations: a speculator cannot necessarily expect to make money
from the knowledge that the market is in a bubble, because he does
not know when the bubble will burst. But the standard version of
the theory has the disadvantage that it has nothing to say about
what gets such speculative bubbles started.
Recent formulations of fads and speculative bubbles that are
not necessarily rational focus on the existence of different
classes of speculators: one class who forecast based on
macroeconomic fundamentals and another who just try to guess which
way the rest of the market is going.The apparently-perverse
increase in the demand for dollars in 1984-85, for example, might
be explained by the decreased confidence speculators were placing
in fundamentalists' forecasts of future depreciation, and the
increased confidence they were placing in the extrapolations of
technical analysts .°
6.Portfolio balance
For present purposes, the most important aspect of the
portfolio-balance model is that it adds a policy tool: its says
that even sterilized foreign exchange intervention, that is,
intervention that does not change money supplies, can affect the
exchange rate. The reason is that investors are assumed to view
50Frankel and Froot (1990), Krugman (1985), and Marris (1985).
46long positions taken in various currencies as imperfect substitutes
for each other, even if they are not holding actual foreign
currency.Other approaches such as the inonetarist model, by
contrast, are quite firmthatonly to the extent that intervention
changes money supplies (in which case it is just a species of
monetary policy) can it have an effect. This is the position Beryl
Sprinkel took, for example, when his French counterpart NIchel
Caindessus tried to argue the desirability of foreign exchange
intervention in preparations for the 1982 Summit of G-7 heads of
state at Versailles.51
Another aspect of the portfolio balance approach is that it
implies that trade-balance equilibration, though not operative in
the short run, is operative in the long run. Because a deficit
country must borrow to finance its deficit, the accumulation of
international indebtedness over time will eventually force its
currency to depreciate. Some would say that mounting indebtedness
is what finally forced the dollar down during the period 1985-87.
IV. COMPETINGVIEWSON DESIRABLE EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS
Differingmodelsas to how the foreign exchange market
operatestranslate into different views as to the appropriate
governmentresponse. But it is not a one—to-one correspondence.
'Putnamand Bayne (p.133).
471. Leave the foreign exchange market alone
There are four principal variants of the school of thought
that says that the government should allow the foreign exchange
market to function freely on its own. The most extreme position,
held by monetarists and the new classical school, says that there
is no need to be concerned about exchange rate fluctuations because
they have no real effects. The simplest form of this argument
claims that movements in the real exchange rate are non—existent,
because movements in the nominal exchange rate only serve to offset
differences in inflation rates.But this view steadily lost
adherents as the l980s progressed, because it was evident that the
nominal appreciation of the dollar was almost fully reflected as a
real appreciation of the dollar. The more sophisticated form of
the argument (the new classical view, mentioned above) holds that,
although there clearly are real fluctuations in the exchange rate,
these are fluctuations due to real changes in productivity or
tastes and would have taken place anyway, even if the exchange rate
had not been freely floating. An increasing number observers also
found this view harder to swallow in 1984-85, but the vote was far
from unanimous.
Even among the large majority who agree that exchange rate
movements have real effects on the trade deficit and other
important variables, there are other viewpoints that lead to the
conclusion that the government should refrain from interfering.
One is the view that exchange rate movements are the natural result
of changes in macroeconomic policy, and may actually be desirable
48if one takes the changes in policy as given.In the case of the
1982-84 dollar appreciation, attributed to the widening federal
budget deficit, the question was whether the dollar appreciation
was desirable if one took the budget deficit as a given political
constraint.
CE.A Chairman Feldstein argued that it was.The strong
dollar acted as a "safety valve" to distribute the crowding-out
effects of the budget deficit more evenly among sectors of the
private economy. The Feldstein Doctrine (so christened by Fred
Bergsten) held that even if policy-makers were somehow able to
force the dollar down without changing fiscal (or monetary) policy
——forexample, by sterilized foreign exchange intervention or
capital controls -—thefavorable effects on the export and import—
competing sectors would be more—than—offset by unfavorable effects:
the lost capital inflow would result in real interest rates even
higher than those prevailing at the time, which would hurt those
sectors of the economy (such as capital goods) where demand is
sensitive to the real interest rate.The result would be a
lopsided recovery. 52
Onerelated viewpoint refuses to "take fiscal and monetary
policy as given." It argues that exchange rate targets or other
financial gimmickry can deflect political resolve to deal with
budget deficits and other domestic objectives that ultimatelymay
CEA (1984), Feldstein (1984).
49be more important than the exchange rate or the trade balance.53
Another argues that if central banks are encouraged to intervene in
the foreign exchange market, they will gambleaway the taxpayers'
money, to little avail.54 A final viewpoint is that floating rates
allow a greater degree of policy independence among countries than
do fixed rates or managed floating (even if they do not allow
complete insulation as held by the trade-balance equilibration
view), and that such de-centralization of national policy-making is
best because each country is the best judge of its own needs.55
2. Commit monetary or fiscal policy to helping stabilize the
exchangerate
Above we mentioned the argument that allowing the full
effect of the mix of monetary and fiscal policies to be reflected
in the exchange rate maximized the chancethat those policies would
beadjusted appropriately. There is a mirror—image argument on the
other side, that committing countries to exchange rate targets
maximizes the chance that monetary and fiscal policy will be
appropriate.
Many believe that the government should commit to some
A counter—argument that places more weight on the exchange— rate and trade-balanceobjectives is based onthe political economy pointthat Congress tends to adopt damaging protectionist polices
when a dollar appreciation increases the trade deficit. Bergsten
(1982, 1984), for example, argued that for such reasons the
exchangerate objective should be given increased weight.
'Thisconcern is common among the monetarists.
Corden (1983).
50degree of stabilization of the exchange rate. One of the more
prominent and practical proposals is the Williamson proposal for
target zones. Part of the argument for making such a commitment is
that, even though macroeconomic policies will ultimately have to be
adjusted in order to keep the exchange rate within the band, such
adjustment is desirable. Williamson (1983, 1987) has argued, for
example, that if target zones had been in place in the early l9BOs,
the Reagan Athninistration would have been forced to abandon its
policies that were producing excessive budget deficits."
3. Attempt to de—couple the exchange rate from other macroeconomic
policies
For anyone aware simultaneously of the trade costs of an
overly strong dollar, the inflationary consequences of an
expansionary monetary policy to depreciate the dollar, and the
political difficulties of cutting the U.S. budget deficit, any sort
of policy instrument that could bring about a depreciation of the
dollar without changing monetary or fiscal policy would be a
godsend. A few such instruments have been proposed.
Sterilized intervention, though it has no effect on the
exchange rate in the view of many because it by definition does not
change money supplies, can have an effect if it changes
56Feldstein,on the other hand, has countered that if a
serious target zone had been in place in the early 1980s, the
government would not have reacted to the dollar appreciation by
cutting the budget deficit, but would sooner have shifted to an
inflationary monetary policy.
51expectations regarding future money supplies g if the portfolio-
balance model is correct. At the Versailles Suzmnit of 1982, the
Frenchargued that foreign exchange intervention did provide an
independent and useful tool; the Americans agreed to form an inter—
governmental working group to study the question (and to enact a
processof "multilateral surveillance" by the Group of 5). The
findings of the working group, known as the Jurgensen Report, were
submitted to the G-7 leaders at the Williamsburg Summit of 1983.
Although the Plaza Accord is widely perceived as having
strikingly reversed the position of the G-7, particularly the
United States, on the question of the effectiveness of
intervention, there was in fact no discussion in the Plaza
deliberations or in the communique as to whether the intervention
undertaken should be sterilized or not. Indeed, there was not much
discussion at the major meetings as to what sort of monetary
policies would be appropriate to support exchange rate objectives.
The exception is that the Plaza Accord called for Japanese monetary
policy to 'exercise flexible management with due attention to the
yen exchange rate."57 When the Bank of Japan raised its discount
rate soon after the Plaza, it claimed a reduction in the yen/dollar
rate as its objective, although others were less sure that this was
truly its motive.
Concerted intervention, that is, by all or most of the G-7
central banks simultaneously, is reported to be more effective.
There is indeed some evidence that the whole may be greater than
Funabashi, p.265, and Dobson, Table 2.4.
52the sum of the parts, especially if the intervention is announced
to the public, and if it reinforces a movement that is already
underway. 58
Capitalcontrols were used by the United States to lessen
downward pressure on the dollar before 1973, and by Germanyand
Japan to stem upward pressure on their currencies. Some, such as
Tobin (1978), Bergsten (1984), and Dornbusch (1986), proposed in
the early 1980s that the U.S. reimpose controls to stem capital
inflow, or that Japan be urged to strengthen its controls on
capital outflow (rather than being pressured to remove them). It
was also suggested that the Japanese government could and did use
administrative guidance to discourage Japanese investors from
holding dollar assets in the early 1980s, or to encourage them to
hold dollar assets in 1987—88.
Most economists viewed these various instruments as unlikely
to be very effective, in the absence of changes or monetary or
fiscal policy. Many practioners, however, believed that they could
have an effect, at least in the short run.
4.Fix the exchange rate
For some countries (small and open), a fixed exchange rate
may be a practical option. Here one of the major arguments for
fixing the rate is to commit monetary policy to a non-inflationary
policy in a way that is sufficiently credible to workers and
financial markets that reduced expectations of inflation help to
58
Dominguezand Frankel (1990).
53eliminate actual inflation. For a country like the United States,
a fixed exchange rate is no longer a very viable option.59
Nevertheless, a special case of a fixed exchange rate
system, the gold standard, was frequently proposed by a certain
influential group, the supply—siders. The same Wall Street Journal
editorial-writers that brought us the Laffer Curve in the area of
tax policy, also brought the Mundell-Laffer hypothesis (which
claimed that changes in the nominal exchange rate were one—for—one
and instantly offset by changes in price levels. so that
devaluations had no real effects), and the proposal that monetary
stability could only be restored by returning to a regime where the
Central Bank made a commitment to peg the price of gold. This view
had important adherents in the starting team at the Treasury in
1981.But in March 1982, the Cold Commission that had been
appointed to investigate such proposals submitted a negative
report. By 1983 only the moderate Manuel Johnson, at the Assistant
Secretary level, was left among the original supply-siders at
Treasury. When Johnson was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board at the beginning of 1986 (joining other recent
appointees perceived as favoring easier money), some feared that
gold standard proponents had taken over. But like Thomas a Becket
after he was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, the historical
integrity of the institution prevailed, and Johnson became a model
of Central Banker rectitude.
McKinnon (1988), however, continued to offer specific
versions of his proposal for a return to fixed exchange rates
(among the United States, Germany and Japan).
54The Administration continued to be susceptible to
penetration by gold bugs, however. Laffer came to meetings of an
academic advisory group in the White House, gold-bug think tanks
like Jude Wanniski's firm Polyconomics and the Lehrman Institute
were heard from frequently, Congressman Jack Kemp was always a
rival for the attentions of Conservative Republican supporters, and
even Vice President George Bush seemed at times to have been
temporarily seduced by visions of gold. Baker, at the October 1987
Annual Meeting of the IMF, proposed that the G—7 add to its list of
indicators the price of 'a basket of commodities, including gold."
This proposal was accepted by the G-7 at the Toronto Summit in June
1988.J
V. COMPETING INTEREST GROUPS
In this section we consider some of the major economic
interest groups affected by the exchange rate.
1. Manufacturing
U.S. manufacturers were clearly hurt by the appreciation of
the dollar in the early 1980s, losingexport customers around the
world and losing domestic customers tocompetition from a flood of
55imports.6° In contrast to smaller, more open, countries, exchange
rate policy in the United States had not traditionally been a high
priority in the list of issues on which the manufacturing sector
would lobby in national politics. But during the period 1983-85,
as the value of the dollar continued to climb to new heights and
the trade balance continued to sink to new lows, an increasing
number of business groups and chief executives from large
corporations lodged complaints in Washington and urged action.
Lee Morgan, Chairman of Caterpillar Tractor in the early
1980s, stands out as an example of activism on the exchange rate
issue, both in terms of the consistency and the earliness (starting
as early as December 198161) of his efforts, and in terms of their
policy pay-off. The Illinois maker of construction equipment was
engaged in intense competition for customers around the world with
a Japanese rival, Komatsu.Morgan realized that, as a major
American exporter, his interest lay with outward—oriented trade
policies rather than protectionism.But he also realized that
taking measures to reduce costs at Caterpillar would not be
sufficient to maintain international competitiveness if they were
offset by appreciation of the dollar.
Morgan's influence went far beyond that of the CEO of a
typical large corporation. He could claim to be a spokesman for
the business community, heading a task force of the influential
60Bransonand Love (1988) provide statistical evidence on the
sectoral effects of the strong dollar.
61Testimonybefore a House Committee, cited by Funabashi
(p.70).
56Business Roundtable, which at his behest took a strong position on
the exchange rate beginning in 1983. Furthermore, he personally
had a degree of access to top policy-makers that went beyond that
of a typical political supporter.62In repeated meetings with
Administration cabinet members (the first one was in the White
House in October 1982), Morgan argued for an activist exchange rate
policy.
For the first two years, such lobbying by the Business
Roundtable and others (the National Association of Manufacturers
was also vocal on the need for policies to bring down the dollar)
appeared to have little or no effect on policy. But, as described
in Section 11.4 above, Lee Morgan's visit to the White House and
Treasury in late September 1983 (with Murchison and Solomon in tow)
was the impetus for Don Regan's entire Yen/Dollar campaign. By the
beginning of 1985, the number of voices from the U.S. manufacturing
sector protesting the Administration's neglect of the dollar and
the trade deficit had multiplied greatly. This was certainly a
major influence on the thinking of Baker and Darman when they
finally shifted the Administration to an activist position on the
exchange rate.
The Business Roundtable was usually careful to say that
62TheReagan Administration was said by insiders to owe a
large political favor to Morgan and his company, as one of three
American suppliers that had heavily lost business when the
government instituted an embargo on equipment being used in the
Construction of the U.S.S.R.-Europe gas pipeline beginning in
December 1981. (Caterpillar lost sales of 200 pipelayers: Nollen,
1987, p.7).it was also relevant that Caterpillar's hometown
(Peoria) had House Minority Leader Robert Michel as its Congressman
and Charles Percy as its Senator.
57measures to try to bring down the dollar should not be taken in
isolation, that measures to reduce the federal budget deficit were
an important part of the package. An interesting question was
whether the economic interest of American manufacturing lay on the
side of efforts to bring down the dollar, if one took the budget
deficit as a fixed political constraint. In the widely accepted
analysis of Feldstein, measures that did not try to work through
macroeconomic policies (say, capital controls, foreign exchange
intervention, or public statements) ——evenif effective at
bringing down the dollar and reducing the trade deficit --would
reduce the capital inflow and raise U.S. interest rates.The
crowding out would be borne less by exchange—rate-sensitive
industries and more by interest-rate-sensitive industries.
Neat theoretical distinctions regarding sector sensitivities
tend to break down, however, as soon as one recognizes that many of
the industries that are most sensitive to the exchange rate are the
same as the ones that are the most sensitive to the interest rate:
autos, aircraft, and capital goods in general. This may explain ——
ifone is willing to attribute enough sophistication to business
leaders ——whymany of them did not devote much energy to the
exchange rate issue until the bubble period of late 1984 and 1985,
when the dollar seemed divorced from the economic fundamentals:
until then, the tradeoff between high interest rates and a high
dollar had been regarded as inexorable, given the budget deficit.
The manufacturing leaders who had been complaining about
Administration neglect of the dollar all praised the Plaza
58Agreement of September 1985. Some, like NAN, continued to call for
a weaker dollar in 1986 and 1987, and in particular to call for
appreciation by Taiwan, Korea, and other NICs. But in the late
1980s the exchange rate was no longer a salient enough issue to
rouse most of the business community to political action.63
2. Agriculture
The agricultural sector is quite sensitive to the exchange
rate. In theory, the effect on the farmer comes directly through
the price he or she receives for his or her product: a ten per cent
increase in the value of the dollar causes an immediate ten per
cent fall in the world price of the crop when expressed in dollars.
In practice, subsidies and other distortions in almost every
country partially insulate farmers from the international market.
But inflationary monetary policies, together with specific
agricultural policies, encouraged American agriculture to expand
output and exports in the 1970s, so that by the l980s they had
indeed become quite dependent on exports.
The switch in the monetary/fiscal policy mix in the early
1980s and the appreciation of the dollar put strong downward
pressure on dollar commodity prices.Existing farm support
programs reduced the impact on the farmer by buying up large
quantities of unwanted crops and making support payments that in
some years were as large as total net farm income.But the
existence of the large accumulated government holdings of
63Destlerand Henning (1987, pp. 130-131.).
59commodities kept prices depressed for some years after the
macroeconomic situation began to reverse in the mid—1980s, so that
the effect of the programs was to spread the negative effect out
over time (not to mention inflict high costs on consumers), rather
than just to dampen it. The rural sector considered the 1980s a
disastrous decade for it, and there was much talk of a bifurcated
economy, with service-oriented California and the Northeast doing
well, and everybody in between (both the rust belt' and the farm
belt) doing poorly.
Farm lobbies came out in favor of a depreciation of the
dollar, and Agriculture Secretary Block was one of the voices in
Cabinet meetings in 1983-85 who were concerned about the policy
mix, dollar, and trade deficit. Agrarian populists consistently
favor easier money, lower interest rates, and a weaker dollar.
Ninety years ago they were championed by Presidential candidate
William Jennings Bryan, who campaigned against the cross of gold,"
the commitment to the gold standard that was keeping money tight.
In the early 1980s, a return to the gold standard was seen as a way
of getting easier money by supply-siders like 1984 presidential
candidate Jack Kemp.64 At the beginning of 1986 agrarian populism
got an easy-money champion, Wayne Angell, appointed to the Federal
Reserve Board. One observer has included the Farm Aid movement as
one of the pressure groups that successfully protested in 1985-86
the high dollar and trade deficit, leading to a switch to policies
64Frankel(1986).
60of intervention intheforeign exchange market and easier money.65
Although the agricultural sector was clearly in the camp
opposed to the strong dollar, it did not expend a great deal of
lobbying time or expense on this particular issue. Obvious
explanations include that lobbying resources expended directly on
farm legislation had a greater payoff, and that a serious attack on
the macroeconomic source of the appreciation (the budget deficit)
would likely include cut-backs on farm subsidies.66But there is
another possible reason why efforts to bring down the dollar, even
taking the budget deficit as given, may not have been clearly in
the farm sector's interest: interest rates. The high real interest
rates that resulted from the l980s switch in macro policy mix were
as much a source of negative pressure on conunodity prices (via low
inventory demand) and of financial distress for farmers (many of
whom were heavily in debt) as the high dollar. Thus the commodity
sector faced the same tradeoff between interest rates and the
dollar as such industries as capital goods, autos, and aircraft: an
effort to bring down the dollar without changing macro policies --
evenif successful ——wouldbe a mixed blessing, in that it would
probably lead to even higher interest rates.
3. Labor
Inclassic Hecksher—Ohljn-Samuelson trade theory, the
65Havrilesky(1990, p.57), who sees this episode as fitting
a "public choice theory of how monetary expansion follows after a
period of redistributive policies.
66Destlerand Henning, p. 124.
61interests of labor and capital (or land), should line up on
opposite sides, according to whether the manufacture of exports and
imports are intensive in their use. In practice, their interests
seem to fit better the "specific-factor" model. Auto workers and
auto capitalists, for example, both have a lot invested in the auto
industry, and thus ally themselves more closely with each other on
questions of trade than with workers or capitalists, respectively,
in other industries. In the case of the strong 1980s dollar, this
means that labor in the manufacturing sector was opposed to the
strong dollar in the same way as managers and owners in that
sector.
Relative to the agricultural sector, labor had a head-start
in the sense that the trade deficit had already been a priority
concern for some time (particularly in the sectors badly hurt by
import competition in the 1970s: auto, steel and textiles). The
AFL—CIO, for example, came out against the Administration's neglect
of the dollar and its implications for the trade deficit in early
1984. But labor representatives gave less priority to the exchange
rate issue than the business community did, in part because they
tended to be more enamored of industrial policy as an alternative
antidote for the trade deficit.67
4.Sectorsthat Benefit from a Strong Dollar
Thereare a number of actors in the economy who benefit from
a strong dollar, most obviously consumers, firms that import inputs
67Destlerand Henning (p.122-24).
62(such as oil and semi—conductors), and the importers themselves
(including shipping, marketing and retail). The entire segment of
the economy composed of goods and services that are not traded
internationally clearly benefits from an increase in the price of
their output in terms of the price of the internationally traded
segment of the economy.The strongest case, in theory, is the
construction industry. In the first place, the tradeable component
there is close to zero. In the second, measures to force down the
dollar at the expense of a cut-off in capital flows and an increase
in real interest rates would hurt the construction sector more
clearly than any other.
All the sectors just named during the strong-dollar period
were silent on the issue.Part of the explanation is that
constituents with grievances tend to speak louder in the political
process than constituents who are benefiting from the current state
of affairs. Much of the explanation is that the links from the
exchange rate to their economic welfare are less tangible, certain,
and well-understood than is the case for the sectors hurt by the
strong dollar. .merican consumers are notoriously unaware of their
ownfondnessfor imports.
In the case of interest—sensitive industries like
construction, even though their lobbying representatives did not
focus on international factors, they always favored a reversal of
the early—1980s pattern of monetary contraction and fiscal
expansion, and high real interest rates. Furthermore, the monetary
authorities were fully aware that they would become a source of
63political pressure in the event that a cut—off of foreign capital
inflows forced up interest rates.
Banks and Other Financial Institutions
At a large 1985 meeting sponsored by Senators Jack Kemp and
Bill Bradley, some representatives of the banking and financial
community were among the few defenders of a laissez-faire exchange
rate regime, against the many industrial executives and other
participants who had gathered to rally around efforts to bring the
dollar down. Lester Thurow declared that the issue was a syndrome
familiar from the United Kingdom, in which the financial community
in the City of London supports a strong currency while the
manufacturing cities support a weak currency. In American terms it
would be "Wall Street' versus "Main Street." But John Bilson, a
self—described currency speculator, responded that the issue is not
a strong dollar versus a weak one, but rather a highly variable
dollar, from which currency traders profit, versus a stable dollar,
which industry finds more conducive.
Foreign exchange trading is big business for banks, both in
terms of volume (over $110 billion a day in 1989) and profit.
Econometric causality tests suggest that higher exchange rate
volatility leads to higher dispersion of opinion across market
participants (as reflected in survey data), and that higher
dispersion in turn leads to a higher volume of trading.68
Exchange—rate volatility is also clearly in the interest of those
Frankel and Froot (1990).
64who make their living trading foreign exchange futures and options
on the Philadelphia and Chicago Mercantile Exchanges; these
instruments did not even exist under the fixed exchange rate system
that ended in 1973. In short, one could explain on simple self—
interest grounds a tendency for the financial community to be more
supportive of floating rates than the rest of the country.
Two representatives of the financial community, in
particular, spoke out against the government's 1985 switch toward
trying to stabilize exchange rates. In 1986 Leo Melamed, Chairman
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, formed a group called the
"American Coalition for Flexible Exchange Rates, to lobby against
exchange rate management. In 1987 and 1988, the Economic Advisory
Committee of the American Bankers' Association also offered public
statements against interfering with floating rates.69
The large New York banks, however, for the most part stayed
away from this sort of activity, and there is no reason to believe
it had much impact.7° Exchange rate volatility, even though a boon
to the foreign exchange trading room, can be a headache to bank
divisions that deal with international borrowing and lending, in
the same way as it is to the international operations of
nonfinancial corporations. In any case, lobbying the government in
favor of volatility would be too anti—social a mode of behavior for
69 Destler andHenning (1988, pp.131-136).
10 Destler andHenning, pp.133-136.They explain that one
reason that much of the banking community viewed with concern
Baker's attempt to manage exchange rates (at the Louvre, in
particular) is that it would threaten the independence of the Fed
in setting monetary policy.
65most banks to engage in.
One place where the New York financial community has secured
the help of the government is in putting pressure on countries in
East Asia and elsewhere to open their financial markets to greater
participation by U.S. firms. Such issues would properly fall in
the sphere of trade policy rather than exchange rate policy, but
for the Treasury's linking them to the campaign to appreciate the
yen in 1984 and the won in 1988-90. In the yen/dollar talks Don
Regan put high priority, for example, on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
making some seats available to American securities companies.7'
VI. COMPETING POLICY-MAXERS
A policy—making agency determines its stand on an issue
based in part on the ultimate goals of its constituents (e.g., low
interest rates or a low dollar) and its perceptions of the link
between policy instruments and the economic goals. Actual policy
is then determined by the interaction of the agencies with each
other, and with the media.
1.Federal Reserve Board
In the United States,the Treasury hasprimary
"Thefirst beneficiary turned out to be Merrill-Lynch, the
company where Regan had previously been Chairman. (Frankel, 1984,
p.47.)
66responsibility for intervention while the Fed has official
responsibility for monetary policy.Indeed, the Treasury in
practice usually determines intervention in the foreign exchange
market, even though the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the
agent that undertakes all intervention in a mechanical sense, and
even though the foreign exchange reserves that are used are the
Fed's own as often as the Treasury's.72 Economic theory says that
it should be virtually impossible to determine exchange rate policy
separately from monetary policy. But the politics of this attempt
at decentralized responsibility have their own logic.
In 1984 and 1985, Volcker, concerned about the trade
deficit, supported the idea of some amount of foreign exchange
intervention to try to bring the dollar down.This put him in
conflict with the Treasury, particularly with Regan and Sprinkel in
1984. There was little question of the Fed Chairman trying to
overcome Treasury objections to intervention; Volcker was well—
advised to save most of his ammunition to protect Fed independence
on monetary policy (and a bit to snipe at the fiscal policies that
were at the root of the trade deficit).But Voicker clearly
welcomed Baker's 1985 abandonment of the position that the strong
dollar was a good thing. He did not view the Plaza as putting
undesirable constraints on monetary policy.
72Fedofficials like Paul Voicker disagree with the position
taken by a series of Treasury officials, that the Treasury has the
ultimate legal authority over intervention even when it is
conducted with the Federal Reserve's own money, but agree that the
Fed has never challenged Treasury supremacy in this area in
practice, and is unlikely to do so in the future.
67Soon after the Plaza, the positions had switched, with the
Treasury in favor of further depreciation of the dollar and Volcker
warning of the dangers of a speculative run. The Fed had no choice
but to go along when the Treasury wanted to intervene. But during
the remainder of the decade, the central bank played the
traditional role of the party more concerned about the dangers of
a free—fall of the currency and an increase in inflation.
By February 24, 1986, the balance of power at the Federal
Reserve Board had swung away from Volcker, in favor of the recent
easy-money Reagan appointees, who voted a reduction in the discount
rate against the opposition of the Chairman in a famous "palace
coup." Volcker then managed to persuade Governors Preston Martin
and Wayne Angell to defer the discount-rate cut until he could
arrange similar coordinated cuts by the Bundesbank and Bank of
Japan. The explanation offered by Volcker was that a unilateral
U.S. monetary expansion would cause the Plaza—depreciation to turn
into an uncontrolled free-fall of the dollar."But it appears
clear that Voicker was also looking for a way to avoid having been
outvoted by his Board, a way to save face and thereby retain the
effective leadership. The Chairman retreated into the complexities
of international finance, knowing that this was unfamiliar
territory to the others. Qne lesson here is that the bonds of
fraternity that existed between Volcker and his counterparts at the
"Funabashi(pp.48-49) accepts the explanation that Voicker
both knew more and cared more about the exchange rate implications
of such actions than did the other, more domestically—oriented
governors.
68German and Japanese central banks were stronger than the
relationship between him and the recent Reagan appointees. It was
not long thereafter that Vice-Governor Martin resigned from the
Board.
Greenspan in 1987 inherited Voicker's concern that a weak—
dollar policy would be an inflationary policy, while Nicholas Brady
in 1988 inherited Baker's concern that a strong-dollar policy would
be bad for growth and bad for the trade balance.Indeed, these
actors were playing out the age—old conflict between central
bankers and treasury ministers over whether or not money should be
tight.
Vice-Chairman Manuel Johnson had responsibility at the Fed
f or dealing with other countries' central banks (after the death of
Henry Wallich, and especially after the resignation of Wallich's
replacement, Robert Heller). Johnson and Mulford reportedly caine
into more open conflict over the dollar than did Greenspan and
Brady.One story has it that after a failure of Johnson and
Nulford to iron out differences in l989, Johnson in protest
registered a technical objection to the way the Treasury was
running exchange rate policy: a disproportionately large share of
the intervention was being conducted with the Fed's reserves fund,
rather than with the Treasury's own Exchange Stabilization Fund.
Later, in the aftermath of the Japanese stock market crash of early
1990, the Johnson-Mulford conflict resurfaced over whether the Fed
or the Bank of Japan should be the one to ease. Johnson resigned
Redburn (1990, p. 63).
69in mid-1990, however.
Most other countries, to a greater extent than the United
States, vest responsibility for exchange rate policy and monetary
policy with the same authority. But when it comes to international
discussions, the U.S. "schizophrenia" seems to prevail. As noted
above, the G—5 Ministers at the Plaza and subsequently did not
discuss sterilization of intervention, or even monetary policy,
when deciding to take action to try to affect the exchange rate.
Whether or not intervention in reality offers a tool for affecting
the exchange rate that is independent of monetary policy, the
policy—making apparatus is set up as if it does: exchange rate
policy is discussed by the C-5 and G—7 Finance Ministers while
monetary policy is discussed by central bankers, for example, at C-
10 meetings ten times a year at the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel. Although the G-7 meetings would probably
benefit from the attendance of the Central Bankers, the latter are
not entirely sure they want to be included. A system in which the
politicians can be seen engaging in international economic
diplomacy in the public eye, without binding the monetary
authorities to the policies that would logically be required if the
commitments to manage exchange rates were interpreted literally, is
a system that has attractions for both sets of actors.
2. The rest of the Administration
In the years 1983-84, the press contained many reports to
the effect that CEA Chairman Feldstein was a lone voice of dissent
70within the Administration, that the White House and the rest of the
Cabinet sided with the Treasury in maintaining that the deficit-
dollar problem was not a problem.In reality, Secretary of
Commerce Malcolm Baidridge, Secretary of Agriculture John Block,
Special Trade Representative (later Labor Secretary) William Brock,
and Budget Doirector David Stockman all spoke out in cabinet and
sub-cabinet meetings ——oftenmore strongly than Feldstein --on
the damage done by the strong dollar.75 The President did not
himself deal with policy issues as detailed as the value of the
dollar, in the sense of running or attending Cabinet meetings on
the subject.
Secretary of State Shultz occasionally expressed a view in
private, based on his own background as an economist. In a very
low-key way, he argued within the Administration for dollar
depreciation as early as July 1983, including even investigation of
a possible "interest equalization tax" on capital inf low.76 But
UnderSecretary for International Affairs Allen Wallis, the State
Department representative at Cabinet—level meetings on the dollar
and the trade deficit, sided with the Treasury position that the
Nor did the President ever "discipline" Feldstein in any way
for failing to toe the line.This would simply not have been
consistent with Reagan's temperament. David Stockman (1986), for
example, reveals that his celebrated 'trip to the woodshed" for
speaking out on the budget deficit never in fact took place. This
allowed Feldstein to claim, truthfully, that he had as much right
to claim to be speaking for the Administration as Regan did.
16Shultzgave a speech at Princeton in the Spring of 1985 that
some considered an important public reversal of the benign neglect
policy of the first Reagan Administration, setting the stage for
the Plaza.
71strong dollar was good rather than bad. In any case, as already
noted, Shultz recognized that dollar issues were the Treasury's
turf, not his.After 1985, with the depreciation underway, the
tendency for other agencies to cede primacy on this issue to the
Treasury was reinforced.
3. Congress
Throughout the 1980s, Congress evinced far more concern with
the U.S. trade deficit than did the White House. In the political
environment of Capitol Hill, denying that a problem like the trade
deficit or the strong dollar is really a problem provokes strong
attacks. Many hearings were held to underscore that these were in
fact serious problems. Studies were commissioned.77 The November
11—13, 1985, conference on the dollar organized by Congressman Jack
Kemp and Senator Bill Bradley (or, more accurately, entrepreneured
by their former staffers Smick and Medley) was billed as a "U.S.
Congressional Summit," and had pretentions even more far—reaching
in scope: legislators and other representatives from foreign
countries were invited, and the organizers also sought to associate
Baker and Darman with the conference's views on world monetary
reform. Such activities had the effect of raising public
consciousness of the exchange rate as an issue.
The Congress was much more limited in the specific policy
"Aswas hinted in Section 11.4 above, some of Caterpillar
Tractor Chairman Lee Morgan's impact on exchange rate issues was
exercised via his Congressmen. For example, he persuaded Senator
Charles Percy to ask the GAO to investigate charges of exchange
rate manipulation on the part of Japan's Ministry of Finance.
72actions it could take, however. The one relevant sphere in which
the Congress did have primacy was trade legislation. Although this
alternative (perceived) means of addressing the trade deficit was
not directly relevant to the exchange rate, there were important
political links. In April of 1985 Senators John Danforth (R) and
Lloyd Bentsen (D) took the position that the Congress should insist
on plans for addressing the exchange—rate problem as a pre-
requisite for granting the Administration the "fast-track
authority' it had requested for (what was to become) the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.78
This case of specifically tying trade policy to the exchange
rate issue was relatively rare. More often, Congressmen simply
responded to the record trade deficits by proposing trade
legislation which free—traders in the Administration found
unpalatable, unintentionally exerting pressure on the Treasury to
trytobring down the dollar and thereby the trade deficit. The
threat of mounting protectionism on Capitol Hill was certainly one
of the major motivations for the Treasury's 1985 turnaround on the
dollar.The success of the Plaza initiative at forestalling
protectionist legislation is the major respect in which Baker
deserves credit for a political triumph, notwithstanding the open
question whether the Plaza was in fact responsible for the dollar
depreciation, and notwithstanding that the trade deficit did not in
fact improve in dollar terms until 1988 (and did not fall below its
1985 level until 1989).
78Destlerand Henning, pp. 104-105.
73The Congress also began to pass resolutions and consider
bills that required specific action on exchange rate policy. Of
several bills submitted in mid-1985, a proposal by Senator Bradley
was the most specific. It would have required the creation of a
"warchest' of intervention funds to be used according to the
following rule: every time four consecutive quarters show a current
account deficit in excess of 1.5 per cent of GNP and a dollar at
least 15 percent above the level corresponding to current account
balance, the Treasury would be required to purchase at least $3
billion in foreign currency over the subsequent quarter. Needless
to say, the Treasury was disturbed by these open assaults on its
right to make exchange rate policy. This threat from the Congress
was another of the factors that contributed to Baker's reversal of
policy in 1985.
Even after the Plaza, skeptical Congressmen continued to
press for systematic reform of exchange rate policy. More bills
were proposed by others, including Representative Stan Lundine (D)
(who, in the original version of his bill, proposed an explict link
between the exchange rate and negotiating authority for the Uruguay
Round).The House Banking Committee in December 1985 passed a
compromise bill that did not quantitatively mandate intervention
like the Bradley proposal, but did require the Secretary of the
Treasury twice a year to report to Congress on exchange rates,
among other provisions. As Congress debated various bills to deal
with the still-widening trade deficit over the subsequent three
years, with the twist of increasing emphasis on the East Asian NICs
74rather than just Japan, proposals regarding exchange rates remained
part of the debate.79
The outcome, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, included a large sub-section on exchange rate policy.In
four areas it called for Treasury activism and, as in the House
Banking Committee bill, required regular Treasury reports to the
Congress: "An assessment of the impact of the exchange rate on the
current account and trade balance, overall economic performance,
competitive position, and indebtedness of the United States;
recommendations for policy changes necessary to achieve a 'more
appropriate and sustainable' current account balance; reporting of
the results of bilateral negotiations with countries that
manipulated their currencies; and analyses of exchange—market
developments and their causes, including capital flows, and of
intervention, among other things. "° In the first four reports
submitted subsequently, the Treasury understandably evaded as much
as possible the injunction to specify exchange rate and current
account targets. But it took up with relish the mandate regarding
countries that "manipulate" their exchange rate, spending a very
high percentage of the reports on Korea and Taiwan.8
4.TheIMF and otherinternational agencies
Destler and Henning pp.99—ill.
80Destlerand Henning,pp.111-113.
81 The results are described in Frankel (1990) and more briefly
in Section 11.11 above.
75The International Monetary Fund has always conducted reviews
of U.S. policy in annual "Article IV" consultations, as it does for
any country. But the U.S. pays no attention whatsoever to these
reviews 82
The IMP did in the 1980s become involved in the G-7 process.
When the G—7 leaders at the 1982 Versailles Summit instructed the
G—5 Finance Ministers to undertake at their regular meetings
multilateral surveillance of the international implications of the
member countries' policies, the Managing Director of the IMF was
invited to participate.
Previously the OECD had been the body that had seen itself
as providing the technical background for G-7 Economic Summits.
This input in theory took place through a succession of meetings of
country officials that began with Working Party 3. In WP 3, Beryl
Sprinkel in 1981-84 patiently explained to other countries' finance
vice—ministers and central bank governors (as well as to his own
country's delegation) the errors in their view of the chain of
causality that ran: budget -interestrate -capitalflow -dollar
—tradedeficit. WP 3 reported to the Economic Policy Committee,
which normally designated as its chair the U.S. Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, in a mostly-futile attempt to get the
American team interested in the deliberations. The EPC in turn
82 In the 1984 consultation, when the IMF staff wrote a report
that subscribed to the widely accepted view that the strong dollar
and trade deficit were problems caused by the budget deficit and
high real interest rates, Sprinkel responded in terms that
suggested that it was the report, rather than U.S. policies, that
needed to be evaluated.
76reported to Ministerial meetings, who reported to the G-7 Summit
leaders 83
TheAmericans (as well as the British) were reportedly
unhappy with "Keynesian" tendencies at the OECD, and so began to
place more emphasis on the IMF. Since 1986 when the G-7 leaders
formalized surveillance with a system of indicators at the Tokyo
Summit, the IMFResearchDepartment has been entrusted with
compiling the countries' numbers.The G—7 Ministers' meetings
begin with a presentation by the IMP Managing Director, providing
an overview of the issues and his recommendations. Exchange rate
issues, however, are mostly treated outside of this 'surveillance"
context •85
Asnoted above, the BIS in Basel is the venue for regular
meetings among the G-1O central bankers.While the tight-knit
group of central bankers operates at a distance from the bright
lightsofmacroeconomicpolicycoordinationandpublic
pronouncements on exchange rates, they are able by telephone to
coordinate the timing of intervention operations or changes in the
°AsCEA Chairman in 1982-84, Feldstein was chairman of the
Economic Policy Committee.He shared with many of the other
countries a belief in the deficit-dollar chain of causality, in
opposition to Regan and Sprinkel. But Feldstein did not view the
apparatus of international cooperation (the OECD, G-5 or G-7, and
Summit meetings) as a particularly useful forum in which to
mobilize support for correction of the U.S. fiscal deficit. He may
have thought that, within the U.S. policy debate, allying with
other countries' governments was more likely to undermine one's
stance politically than to reinforce it.
84Dobson(1990, p.13).
Dobson (1990, pages 3.5, 3.24 and 3.28).
77discount rate more precisely than the finance ministers are able to
coordinate anything.
VII.THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY-
MAKING
A number of generalizations have been, or can be, hazarded
regarding the making of exchange rate policy.
1. The switch from benign neglect to activism as a political cycle
The 1985 switch in Reagan Administration attitudes toward
the dollar was a complete about—face. (Administration spokesmen
initially denied that there had been such a 180-degree change in
course, but as public approval of the Plaza grew, Baker accepted
credit for it as a new policy initiative.) It would be good to
have an explanation for such a shift in policy that went beyond the
specifics of the change in personnel.
A benign view of the switch has been offered by Cohen
(1988): the political process worked in the way it should, as the
Administration eventually responded to the grievances of groups
adversely affected, by adopting policies to bring down the dollar.
A less benign view would ask, first, whether the Administration
should not have recognized the dollar as a problem much sooner, and
second whether even the Plaza switch was indeed an adequate way to
address the trade deficit, given the lack of simultaneous progress
78on thebudget deficit and national saving.
It has been suggested by others that there is a regular
cycle within the term of a given political leader, for many
countries, but especially large countries like the United States
for which international trade historically makes up a relatively
small proportion of GNP. In his initial vision for the country,
the leader ignores concerns of international trade, finance and
exchange rates.In part this is because he has usually won his
office by courting exclusively domestic constituencies. In part it
is because he is not fully aware of economic relationships such as
that between excessive spending and trade deficits or such as
constraints placed on his country by the need to maintain the
confidence of international financial markets. Later in his term,
problems develop and he switches to international activism, either
because unpleasant international deficits demand a response, or
because the prospect of international economic diplomacy offers a
pleasant diversion of popular attention from domestic problems.
Bergsten (1986) has argued that when the Reagan Administration
switched abruptly from benign neglect of the dollar to activism in
1985, it was following a pattern traced by Johnson in the late
1960s, Nixon in 1971, and Carter in 1978.
2.Proposals for Reform of the Policy-making Structure
For thosewho think that the difficulties stemming from the
large swings in the dollar in the 1980s could have been handled
better by policy—makers, it is natural to ask if there are not some
79inherent flaws in the structure of the policy-making process that
could be addressed by institutional reform.
One view is that the difficulty with the 1981—85 dollar
appreciation, indeed the difficulty with the overall macroeconomic
policy mix of the decade, was lack of coordination between the
United States and its trading partners. In this view, the U.S.
government deliberately chose a policy mix that would give high
real interest rates and a strong dollar, in order to reduce import
prices, thereby "exporting inflation" to its neighbors. In
technical terms, the Nash noncooperative solution is characterized
by competitive appreciation, each country afraid to lower real
interest rates on its own because of the inflationary consequences
of currency depreciation.If this diagnosis is correct, the
solution would simply be to strengthen the G-7 coordination
process, and use it to agree to simultaneous reductionsin real
interest rates.96 The difficulty with this theory as an
interpretation of the 1980s is that (1) only the U.S., not its
major trading partners, adopted a policy mix featuring fiscal
expansion and (2) if currency appreciation is such an advantageous
means of reducing inflation, then the U.S. policy of the early
86 Sachs (1985). Another version of the view that the problem
is a lack of international coordination involves beggar-thy-
neighbor "competitive depreciation,"justthe reverse of
competitive appreciation.Here the problem with the Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium is that each country is tempted to follow
an overly expansionary monetary policy in order to depreciate its
currency and improve its trade balance, thereby exporting
unemployment to its trading partners. One could view the Louvre
Accord as an attempt by U.S. trading partners to address this
problem.
801980s was optimal (from a selfish viewpoint), which would tend to
undercut the case for reform.
A second view is that the difficulty with the 1981-85 dollar
appreciation, and the overall U.S. macroeconomic policy mix, was
lack of coordination between the Treasury and the Fed. The Fed
refused to expand the money supply in the absence of a commitment
on the part of the Administration to raise taxes and cut the budget
deficit, because it would be inflationary.The Administration
(together with Congress) refused to raise taxes and cut the budget
deficit in the absence of a commitment on the part of the Fed to
allow interest rates to fall sufficiently, because it would be
recessionary. In this view, the high real interest rates and high
dollar occurred simply because the two sides never could get
together on the policy mix.
it is true that Fed officials tended to be included in
interagency meetings on international economic topics less often in
the Reagan Administration than in previous Administrations. Paul
Voicker and Don Regan, in particular, were often at odds in the
press. Nevertheless, communication was regular, and there is no
evidence that, but for the right institutional arrangement to
promote cooperation, a deal could have been struck. Rather,
disagreements stemmed either from differing priorities (the Fed
more concerned about inflation, the Treasury about growth), or from
differing perceptions as to the right model.°7
The leading recent proposal for systematic reform of the
eiFrankel(1988b).
81U.S. institutional structure of exchange rate policy—making is that
of Destler and Henning. They argue that exchange rate policy is
made by a very small circle of senior government officials in the
Treasury and Fed, is dangerously divorced from fiscal and monetary
policy, and is frequently unresponsive to the legitimate concerns
of private economic actors. They recommend a broadening of the
process, particularly through three important changes: (1) the
creation in both the House and Senate of new Select Oversight
Committees on the Dollar and the National Economy; (2) the
establishment of a new private—sector Advisory Group on Exchange
Rates to counsel the secretary of the Treasury; and (3) more active
involvement of agencies such as the CEA, USTR, and Agriculture and
Commerce Departments 88
The view of this author is that, during the period July 1984
—February1985, the dollar had appreciated so far that some action
such as foreign exchange intervention to try to bring it down was
indeed warranted, even taking the budget deficit as given. Since
all the groups that Destler and Henning would like to bring in to
the policy-making process were more worried about the dollar and
the trade deficit at this time than the Regan Treasury, it follows
that exchange rate policy during this eight-month period might have
been better had their proposed institutional reforms already been
in place. Under most other circumstances, however, a broadening of
Destler and Henning, pp.145-164. One of their, quite valid,
purposes in making the proposals was to make the exchange rate a
deliberate policy instrument consistent with macroeconomic policy,
rather than treating it as a residual.
82the policy process in this way, in the sensitive and relatively
technical area of exchange rates, could make things worse rather
than better.
Exchange rate policy, like monetary and fiscal policy, is
potentially vulnerable to populist pressures. Policy-makers in the
public eye ——lackingforbearance, and sometimes lacking awareness
--mightsuccumb to the temptation to tinker with international
financial gimmickry so as to seem to be addressing the exchange
rate issue, in place of making hard macroeconomic policy decisions.
Sometimes they will refuse to devalue a currency that needs to be
devalued, out of a stubborn unwillingness to admitpubliclythat
their past policies have failed. Other times they will seek to
devalue a currency that should not be, in order to gain the short—
term advantage of higher output and employment, figuring that the
costs in terms of higher inflation will not show up until after the
next election. For such reasons, I am skeptical of proposals to
democratize the policy—making process for exchange rates and would,
if anything, prefer to see more power concentrated with the Federal
Reserve.The Fed tends to have more of the historical memory,
technical expertise, and insulation from politics, that are so
lacking elsewhere.
3. TheBandwagon as paradigm
Iwould like topropose a common paradigm to fitthe
markets,the media, and the makers of policy. The paradigm is the
Bandwagon, by which I mean that the typical resident of each of the
83three worlds bases his actions more on what seems to be "in" at the
moment, than on what makes the most sense viewed in longer-term
perspective.
Consider first the markets. In theory, speculators should
base their actions on an evaluation of the true worth of the
currency as determined by macroeconomic fundamentals. In practice,
by 1985, only 5 out of 24 foreign exchange forecasting services
were relying on fundamentals. (Fifteen relied on technical
analysis, 3 used both, and 1 did not specify). This is as compared
to 1978 when 19 of 23 services surveyed relied on fundamentals (3
on technical analysis).89This lack of attention to long-term
fundamentals and increasing reliance on time—series extrapolations
may explain the apparent speculative bubble of 1984-85.
A speculative bubble would seem to offer some scope for
useful intervention by policy-makers. It is for this reason that
the Plaza and other 1985 policy moves to try to bring down the
dollar could be viewed as a success.But to favor government
intervention as a regular matter of course, one would have to
believe that the policy-making process is systematically less
liable to bandwagons than the markets, and this may not be the
case.
Historical memory in both the Treasury and the Congress is
notoriously short.Official views do not evolve gradually over
time as more information becomes available. Rather views change
89Frankeland Froot (1990).
84sharply with the personnel, who turn over every few years, and with
their economic philosophy or perception of political advantage.
The non-interventionist dogmatism of Beryl Sprinkel has come in for
much criticism;the political pragmatism of a Jim Baker will
usually win out in a popularity contest among newspapermen or
Congressmen, and in 1985 it happened to give what may have been the
right answer as economic policy as well. But pragmatism can often
give the wrong answer.Trade policy is an example where the
stubbornness of the Treasury and White House in the 1980s was
fortunate, and where greater accommodation to the Congress or
outside interests would have given a less satisfactory outcome,
from an economic viewpoint.
It may sound undemocratic to reserve exchange—rate policy-
making for a small elite like the Federal Reserve Board.But
democracy does not mean putting every issue up for a vote every
day.Our system places some policy—makers under the relatively
frequent and direct control of the electorate, such as the two—
year-termed Congress, and others farther removed, such as the
members of the Supreme Court.The question is whether exchange
rate policy is a more fitting topic for the former approach or the
latter. Exchange rate policy would seem to be the sort of topic
that is best reserved for specialists removed from political
pressures.
Although the media were not considered above as a separate
interest group or policy-maker, they are in fact the ultimate
arbiter of policy. Most critics of the tremendouspower of the
85media phrase their criticism in terms of the particular bias that
they think the media have (which is usually in truth the mirror
image of the bias held by the critic in question). But the real
problem with the media is that, in its efforts to escape charges of
bias, it does not undertake enough analysis. Journalists cover the
stories that other journalists are covering (so—called 'pack
journalism'). The goal is to describe current trends, rather than
to give opinions.The arbiters of policy can end up being
arbitrary in their evaluations.
Success in Washington is often judged in a rather
superficial way.The system in the aggregate works a bit like
trial by fire or water in medieval times. A policy operation is a
success if it is a political success; it is a political success if
it is a media success; it is a media success if it is a success in
the public opinion polls. The opinion polls often resemble coin-
tosses, because the respondents are not well—acquainted with the
issues that the questions concern.
It is of course true that the dollar began to depreciate in
1985, as desired. But the policy-makers may have just been lucky.
The initiatives taken by Jim Baker at the Plaza and other G.-7
meetings were, at the time, so tentative that he could, and would,
have disavowed that there had been any change in policy if they had
not been received well. These initiatives were received well, in
large part because Baker's style was such a welcome relief
(especially to the press) after Don Regan. Regardless whether one
believes that the dollar would have come down in 1985-87 even
86without the initiatives, it is certain that favorable reviews, such
as those in newspaper editorials and congressional testimony, made
them a political success.
The enhanced stature of Baker and the G—7 in turn meant that
their pronouncements carried more weight with the markets. Foreign
exchange traders in 1986 and 1987 would leap for their terminals
every time a report caine out that Baker had said something. G-7
meetings after 1985 replaced trade balance announcements (or, in
the early l980s, money supply announcements) as the current fad
variable that the markets followed.
By 1984 the market bandwagon had carried the dollar far away
from a sensible equilibrium. In 1985 the interdependent bandwagons
ridden by the media and the makers of policy carried the dollar
back. Next time, the media/policymaker bandwagons could as easily
be the ones to carry the dollar away from equilibrium.
* * *
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